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A characteristic of insurgency and internal defense is the difficulty of leaders to accurately gauge progress or regression. The measurement of progress is necessary in order to provide officials with a basis for continuing, improving, or discarding the adopted strategy. Traditional indicators of success such as divisions destroyed, territory occupied, and shipping tonnage sunk have much less applicability in insurgent warfare than in general war; yet some method must be devised to measure progress. By evaluating success in populace and resource control, the number of restrictive measures can be kept to a minimum; and timely changes in the program can be made to cope with variations in the levels of insurgent activity.

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MEASURING SUCCESS IN POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

An abstract for a thesis presented to the Faculty of
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
B. M. WATTS, MAJ, USA

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1967

U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ii

ABSTRACT

The Problem and Its Importance

A characteristic of insurgency and internal defense is the difficulty of the leaders to accurately gauge progress or regression. The measurement of progress in internal defense is necessary in order to provide responsible officials with a basis for continuing, improving, or discarding the adopted strategy and making the vital decisions required. Traditional indicators of success such as divisions destroyed, territory occupied, and shipping tonnage sunk have much less applicability in insurgent war than in general war; yet some method must be devised to accurately evaluate progress. The measurement of success in the populace and resources control program is a major step forward in resolving this problem. By evaluating success in populace and resources control, the number of restrictive measures can be kept to a minimum; and timely changes in the program can be made to cope with variations in the levels of insurgent activity.

Methodology Used in Solution

The composition of a successful populace and resources control program was established by a review of the populace and resources control techniques used during the insurgencies that occurred in Greece, Malaya, Algeria, and the Philippines. Each component of the successful program was examined to determine parameters and indicators of success. A measurement system employing the parameters and indicators was then

1

devised to evaluate progress in each of the elements of the populace and resources control program. The general feasibility of employing the proposed measurement system was examined, and a determination was made of its general applicability in internal defense operations.

Analysis of Data and Findings

A review of insurgencies in Greece, Malaya, Algeria, and the Philippines disclosed the elements of a successful populace and resources control program. These elements are: appropriate legislation and regulations; effective law enforcement forces; a framework of security consisting of secured villages, area, and lines of communications; screening and documentation of the populace, detection and elimination of the insurgent infrastructure; and the strict control of material resources.

A measurement system to determine success consists of collecting and processing functions. Data on the current status and accomplishments of control activities of each element of the populace and resources control program is collected at village and district levels. The data is then consolidated and collated at intervening and national levels. Comparisons of current information with information from previous reports are made to determine progress and trends in the populace and resources control program. The trends and changes determined by the measurement system illustrate the direction of progress in populace and resources control. When a careful evaluation is made of the success in the various elements of the program, deficiencies and problem areas become apparent. Action can then be taken to resolve the problems or increase emphasis on deficient aspects. The responsible officials are advised on the success of the component parts of the

program and can then make timely adjustments in populace and resources control techniques to cope with various levels of insurgent activity.

The feasibility of the measurement system is determined largely by the nature and extent of the populace and resources control program, availability and reliability of data, and the adequacy of competent personnel to collect and process the data. The measurement system requires detailed and accurate data and imposes a requirement for detailed recordkeeping at village and district levels. However, the required skill level of personnel does not exceed that necessary for routine administrative functions.

Conclusions

Measurement of success is an essential part of an effective populace and resources control program. By evaluating all aspects of the program through the use of the proposed measurement system, only those restrictive controls necessary need be imposed; and maximum effectiveness of populace and resources control forces can be achieved. Information on the effectiveness of populace and resources control activities and problem areas will be made readily available to the officials in charge allowing them to direct the program more efficiently. Systematic measurement of success will provide a valuable tool to the internal defense operator by focusing attention to aspects that need improvement and assisting in the overall evaluation of the success of internal defense.

Biography of Author

The author was born in Walker, Louisiana, 26 October 1928. He received Bachelor of Science and Masters of Education degrees from

Louisiana State University prior to being inducted into the Army in January 1951. Major Watts was commissioned in the Signal Corps 19 June 1952 and transferred to Artillery in 1958. He is a graduate of the Guided Missile Staff Officers Course, U.S. Army Air Defense School, and is a member of the Atomic Energy and Research and Development Officer Specialist Program.

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ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Objectives of Research

Officers in the Armed Forces of the United States must prepare

for a wide spectrum of conflict, ranging from general nuclear war to

assisting developing nations defend against insurgent war. Since Com-

munist subversive insurgency appears to be the presently favored method

of expanding international communism, assisting in peace-keeping or

stability operations will continue to be a normal U.S. Army mission.[1]

Cloaked in such terms as "liberation wars" and "people's struggles,"

insurgent war poses a most serious threat to the free world; for it

seeks to use the resources of a nation against itself. This danger

must be recognized and dealt with if democracy is to survive. Military

strategists should take notice of the warning of the noted political

scientist, Hannah Arendt, who said:

> In the contest that divides the world today in which so much
> is at stake, those will probably win who understand revolution,
> while those who still put their faith in power politics in the
> traditional sense of the term and, therefore, in war as the last
> resort of all foreign policy may well discover in a not too dis-
> tant future that they have become masters in a rather useless and
> obsolete trade.[2]

This thesis addresses one aspect of revolutionary conflict: a

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[1]Harold K. Johnson, "Landpower Missions Unlimited," _Army_, XV
(November, 1964), 41-42.

[2]Hannah Arendt, _On Revolution_ (New York: Viking Press, 1963),
p. 8.

nation's actions directed towards its citizens during conditions of insurgent war. Any successful effort to combat insurgency must include measures to restrict the clandestine operations of the insurgent and destroy his relationship with the population. These measures form the populace and resources control program of internal defense. A unique characteristic of insurgency and its antithesis, internal defense, is the difficulty of the leaders to accurately gauge progress or regression in achieving their respective goals. In conventional war, progress is measured in terms of divisions destroyed, shipping tonnage sunk, territory occupied, and other readily interpretable indicators. However, in internal defense, measurement of progress is much more complex. There are no fixed battle lines; the guerrilla force is an army in the shadows, extremely difficult to find and fix; and occupation of territory has little significance except on a very long term basis. Yet, some method of evaluation must be devised to provide the responsible officials with a basis for continuing, improving, or discarding the adopted strategy and making the vital decisions required.

Statement of the Problem

This thesis is an examination of the problem of measuring the success of the populace and resources control program in internal defense. However, before a measurement system can be developed, a determination of the component parts or elements of a successful populace and resources control program must be accomplished. The composition of a successful program can be established by a review of the populace and resources control techniques utilized in selected insurgency cases. Each component must then be examined to determine if

success can be measured, and if so, what are the parameters and indicators of success. Then a measurement system evaluating all the program elements can be devised utilizing the selected parameters and indicators of success. Finally, the general feasibility of employing such a system must be evaluated, and a determination made to the system's general applicability in internal defense operations.

Method of Approach

In order to gain an insight of successful populace and resources control, four insurgency case histories will be examined. These cases are Greece, 1946-1949; Philippines, 1946-1954; Malaya, 1948-1960; and Algeria, 1954-1962. These have been selected because of the availability of source material, the different regions of the world affected, the assisting nations involved, and the fact that each contains a wide range of populace and resources control measures used in the campaigns to defeat the insurgents. Although each case has its individual characteristics, many of the problems encountered and the solutions developed are common to all and may be expected to occur in future conflicts of this type. These common factors will be extracted and reviewed to isolate valid indications of success or failure. From these indicators, measurement tools will be devised to evaluate progress. By assembling these individual tools into a composite, an overall progress measurement system for populace and resources control will be made.

Nature of Revolution

Modern history is recording a rapidly expanding world population and an increasing number of nation states. Emerging nations on

4

the continents of Asia, Africa, and South America are being courted by
both East and West in the ideological struggle for international influ-
ence in the world today. There is no area left on earth where man can
live and prosper that isn't claimed by some nation. Man is born, lives,
and dies only with the official recognition of his state. There are
several components of a nation state, one of the most important of
which is its population or people. A second is nationalism. Nation-
alism is defined by Stoessinger as a people's sense of collective
destiny through a common past and the vision of a common future.[3] The
people consent to the authority of the state in exchange for protection
and the satisfaction of their aspirations. If the state fails to pro-
vide protection and satisfy the aspirations of its citizens, then it
no longer deserves the sovereignty granted it. Jean Bodin defined this
sovereignty as the state's supreme power over its citizens and subjects.
This concept is still valid today, and a state's authority covers the
spectrum from the power of taxation to the right to send its citizens
to their death.[4]

If some of the members are dissatisfied with the way the
government exercises its authority, they may attempt to effect a
change in the operation of the government or possibly attempt to
replace the government itself. Changes may also be desired in other
structures of the society. If serious dissatisfaction is widespread
and changes are not effected, the nation may be subjected to a revolu-
tion. Although an analysis of the nature, causes, and patterns of

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[3]John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (1st ed. rev.; New
York: Random House, 1965), p. 10.

[4]Stoessinger, p. 8.

revolutions is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to
establish a common basis in order to understand the terminology used.
What is a revolution? This word has been used so extensively in such
terms as the industrial revolution, social revolution, and the revolu-
tion of rising expectations that its meaning has become obscure. Since
this study is concerned with the illegal use of force to achieve
change, a definition embodying this concept is desirable. The one
utilized by the Special Operations Research Office of American Universi-
ty is satisfactory. "Revolution is the modification, or attempted
modification, of an existing political order at least partially by the
unconstitutional or illegal use or threat of use of force."[5]

Revolutions may be classified by several methods, but all
authorities recognize several common types. Johnson suggests these
six categories: (1) jacquerie, (2) millenarian rebellion, (3) anarch-
istic rebellion, (4) jacobin communist revolution, (5) conspiratorial
coup d'etat, and (6) militarized insurrection.[6] These categories are
established based on the following four criteria: (1) targets of
revolutionary activity, (2) identity of the revolutionaries, (3)
revolutionary goals or ideology, and (4) whether or not the revolu-
tion is spontaneous or calculated. Targets may be the government, the
regime, or the community.[7]

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[5]Special Operations Research Office (SORO), Casebook on Insur-
gency and Revolutionary Warfare, 23 Summary Accounts (Washington:
American University, 1962), p. 3.

[6]Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford,
Calif.: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace; Stanford
University, 1964), p. 28.

[7]Chalmers Johnson, p. 28.

Of the categories listed above, the major one of interest in this work is the militarized insurrection. These are calculated revolutionary wars that follow a prescribed strategy. They are made by a portion of the population, usually a minority guided by a conspiratorial revolutionary staff. Their ideologies are nationalistic, and the objective is the replacement of a regime by waging revolutionary war against it.[8]

These militarized insurrections are called "wars of liberation" by Communists and constitute the current vehicle used in their efforts to seize power in the developing nations of the world. Termed insurgent war by the U.S. Army, this form of conflict poses a serious challenge to free countries everywhere, because it hides behind a facade of nationalism and social justice. Such war, when Communist inspired and supported, must be opposed by the free world if the current balance of power is to be maintained.

Revolutionary Doctrine

Early Communist intellectuals recognized the possibilities of subversive insurgency but were preoccupied with developing the revolution in the industrial societies of Europe. Both Marx and Engels were aware of the nationalistic tensions in colonial territories and saw the possibilities of making them serve the Communist movement. Marx was interested in the wars of liberation in the nineteenth century and recognized insurgency techniques. In one of his letters he wrote:

> A people resolved to be independent should not be satisfied with conventional methods of warfare. Riots, revolts, and

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[8]Chalmers Johnson, p. 57.

guerrilla tactics are the ways by which a small nation can over-
come a large one. It is the only way a weak army can resist a
large, well-trained army.9

However, it was not until Lenin prescribed the strategy and tactics for

Communist revolutions that the ideas of insurgency as practiced today

were formalized. Lenin demanded the immediate liberation of the

colonies of the large European powers because he attributed the con-

tinued existence of capitalism to the exploitation of colonies (impe-

rialism). He went so far as to direct civil war to achieve this end.10

Surveying the world as it existed in the late nineteenth cen-

tury, Lenin observed the potential of colonial and semifeudal areas in

his concepts of world communism. Referring to these areas he said:

> The semi-colonial countries like China, Persia, Turkey and all
> colonies, have a combined population amounting to a billion. . . .
> Socialists must not only demand the unconditional and immediate
> liberation of the colonies without compensation . . . but they must
> render determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the
> bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation in these
> countries and assist their rebellion—and if need be, their revolu-
> tionary war against the imperialist powers that oppress them.11

Communists countries have followed this direction and regard it as

justification and their solemn duty to incite, support, and assist

Communist inspired insurgencies in any emerging nation if the oppor-

tunity rises.

In a speech to the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties on

January 6, 1961, Premier Nikita Khrushchev notified the world of the

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9Henri Chambre, From Karl Marx to Mao Tse-tung, trans. R. J.
Olsen (New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1963), pp. 204-05.

10Nikolai Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International
Publishers, 1943), V, 269.

11Lenin, V, 275.

future strategy of the Soviet Union. In addition to his pronouncements

on peaceful coexistence, his far ranging remarks covered the subject of

insurgent war. He stated:

> Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism
> exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary
> wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable, since the
> colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily. . . . These
> are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes, against the
> colonizers. The Communists fully support such just wars and march
> in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles.[12]

More than two years later in a rally honoring Fidel Castro, who was

visiting Moscow, Premier Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position on

insurgent war:

> Marxist-Leninists make no secret of the fact that they want to
> win all the people on earth to socialism. This we regard as our
> most important aim in the world arena. . . . Our party has always
> held that peaceful coexistence creates favorable conditions for the
> development of the class struggle by the working people of capi-
> talist countries, for a steady development of the national liber-
> ation movement. The Soviet Union and all the Socialist countries
> regard it as their internationalist duty to give every support
> and all-round assistance to the national liberation movement.[13]

These pronouncements, couched in the Aesopian language characteristic

of Communist leaders, make it crystal clear that the Soviet Union

intends to foment, encourage, and support subversive insurgency as a

means of achieving political goals.

Much has been written about the Sino-Soviet split, but appar-

ently there is agreement on the theory of insurgent wars or "wars of

liberation." Lin Piao in his noted essay, "Long Live the Victory of

People's War!," uses essentially the same language as Khrushchev in

writing of support of this form of warfare:

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[12] U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, <u>Hearings, Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961</u>, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 64-65.

[13] <u>New York Times</u>, May 24, 1963, p. 12.

"The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."[14]
With both Moscow and Peking instigating "people's struggles" in emerging nations, peace throughout the world appears rather remote.

Mao Tse-tung, leader of the great Chinese Revolution, was the first to develop a specific blueprint for insurgency. Mao's techniques deserve considerable attention because they form the pattern that has been emulated most in recent years. Mao viewed his revolution as consisting of two steps. The first was to convert colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal societies into an independent, democratic society. The second step was to develop the revolution further and build up a socialist state.[15] This was achieved by conducting protracted war primarily through the employment of guerrilla forces. Once an area was liberated, then the existing society was introduced to communism.

Mao recognized four characteristics of China's revolutionary war which have universal applicability in any potential insurgency. First, China was a semi-colonial country unevenly developed both politically and economically. Second, the government in power (Kuomintang) was very strong. Third, the Red Army was weak and small. Last, the Communist Party's leadership and the agrarian revolution were decisive elements.[16] In achieving his revolution, Mao's strategy was rather simple and consisted of these six points.

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[14]Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!," _Peking Review_, September 3, 1965, p. 24.

[15]Mao Tse-tung, _Selected Works_ (New York: International Publishers, 1954), III, 110.

[16]Mao Tse-tung, I, 193-96.

1. Carry out quick decisive attacks according to plan when on the defensive.

2. Coordinate with regular warfare.

3. Establish base areas.

4. Undertake the strategic defensive and then the strategic offensive.

5. Develop into mobile warfare.

6. Establish the correct relationships of command.[17]

Mao perfected the art of guerrilla warfare in his long war against the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek's forces. His famous sixteen word tactics dictum: "enemy advances, we retreat, enemy halts, we harass, enemy tires, we attack, enemy retreats, we pursue," is religiously followed by all modern day insurgents.[18] Although great importance was placed on guerrilla warfare, other aspects of maintaining power were not neglected. Very significant was the establishment of base or "liberated" areas. These areas which the guerrillas completely controlled were used to support other zones and were organized into model Communist societies.

Mao, like Lenin before him, regarded the Communist Party as the leader of the revolution and its chief organizer. Writing in 1939, Mao described the prominence of the party.

> Except for the Communist Party, none of the political parties, bourgeois or petty bourgeois, is equal to the task of leading China's two great revolutions, democratic and socialist, to their complete realization.[19]

The major duties of the party are to organize the population and develop

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[17]Mao Tse-tung, II, 121-23.   [18]Mao Tse-tung, I, 212.

[19]Mao Tse-tung, III, 101.

the guerrilla armed forces. The organization of the population and the development of an infrastructure are the key elements in a Communist insurgency. This organization is military, political, social, and economic and permeates every aspect of the society.

Probably most of the success of insurgency can be attributed to the thoroughness of organization and the exploitation of the human factor. Highly disciplined cells influence important groups and organize parallel hierarchies which become the party's invisible machines controlling peasant, youth, sports, labor unions, and other organizations.[20]

Eugene Methvin accurately depicts this methodology. The party recruits and indoctrinates agents from the indigenous population and creates them into a quasi-religious and a fanatically obsessed hard-core cadre. The party trains them in a pragmatic body of operational techniques developed and tested through years of revolutionary warfare. Some form of schooling, formal or informal, is used to mold new cadres and create a general staff of indigenous personnel for the insurgency. This system produces organized "Typhoid Marys" who go about spreading the virus of insurgent ideology.[21] "Once the parallel hierarchies are established, the major task of the movement is not to out-fight, but to out-administer the government."[22]

The insurgents employ a full range of weapons to achieve their

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[20]Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Principles of Counterinsurgency," Orbis, VIII (Fall, 1964), 655.

[21]Eugene H. Methvin, "Ideology and Organization in Counterinsurgency," Orbis, VIII (Spring, 1964), 109-10.

[22]E. Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare," Nation, August 30, 1965, p. 97.

purpose. If persuasion fails, then terrorism is substituted. Aiming for popular support, the organizer ruthlessly eliminates those that offer resistance and forces the remainder to commit themselves one way or the other.

U.S. Doctrine

Although the United States has specific goals in its relations with each individual nation, three overall objectives are paramount. A basic premise of United States foreign policy is that national security and American fundamental values and institutions will best be preserved and enhanced in a society of truly free and independent nations. To achieve and maintain this community of nations, the United States endeavors to assist developing countries to maintain their freedom and independence and to deal effectively with their problems pertaining to economic development, political stability, and social justice. The creation of a relatively stable international environment within which economic development can occur and free people are able to determine their own form of government is also a primary U.S. objective.

The United States recognizes that the primary responsibility for preventing or eliminating internal aggression rests with the threatened country. To assure that all nations, especially the developing countries, are free to determine their own future, the United States will provide assistance upon request to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency.[23]

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[23]U.S., Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations: Counterinsurgency (U), FM 100-20 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1964), p. 9. (CONFIDENTIAL).

Since World War II, the foreign policy of the United States has generally been guided by the above objectives. The United States has provided military and economic assistance to over one hundred countries since 1946, in the belief that strong and viable nations would be much less susceptible to the appeals of international communism.[24] American policy has changed very little since President Harry S. Truman said in his 1949 inauguration address:

> We will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression. . . . We will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security. . . . Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to provide more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens. Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.[25]

President Dwight D. Eisenhower continued this policy of military and economic assistance throughout his eight year administration, although the basic national strategy was that of nuclear deterence by the threat of massive nuclear retaliation.

President John F. Kennedy recognized that the United States required a greater flexibility in its response to Communist aggression and commenced the strengthening of conventional military forces and the development of an internal defense capability within the U.S. Armed Services. Speaking at West Point on 6 June 1962, President Kennedy made these remarks concerning insurgent war:

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in

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[24]U.S. News and World Report, August 15, 1966, pp. 46-47.

[25]U.S. Congress, House, Inaugural Address of the Presidents of the United States, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, House Doc. 218, pp. 254-55.

its orgin. . .war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.[26]

President Lyndon B. Johnson continued the Kennedy policy and the improvement of conventional forces. However, a serious challenge to American policy developed with the increased intensity of the insurgent war in the Republic of South Vietnam. The nation's overall foreign policy was summarized by President Johnson in a speech made in Chattanooga, Tennessee, 24 October 1964. He said:

We must hold firmly to these four principles of peace: One, we must continue to resist Communist aggression. Two, we must support the United Nations and advance the unity of our NATO allies, and of the entire Atlantic community. Three, we must assist the developing nations to become stable members of the free world community. Four, we must enlarge the ban on nuclear tests, and we must keep the ultimate purpose always before us of a world that is free of the threat of nuclear destruction.[27]

The United States increased its commitment to the Republic of South Vietnam in 1965 including the introduction of U.S. combat forces to bolster the internal defense capability of the Republic of South Vietnam. Meeting in Manila in October, 1966, the President, joining with the heads of states of six other countries, reiterated the common

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[26]U.S., President, 1961-63(Kennedy), Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States; John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 453.

[27]U.S., President, 1963- (Johnson), Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States; Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), II, 413.

goals in Vietnam and in the Asian and Pacific areas. The common goals are:

1. To be free from aggression.

2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.

3. To build a region of security, order, and progress.

4. To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific.[28]

Probably no one expresses better the goals that America seeks in defeating insurgency than Presidential Assistant Walt W. Rostow. Addressing a graduating class at the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center he stated:

> This will not be a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union. It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism. It will be a victory of men and nations which aim to stand up straight, over the forces which wish to entrap and exploit their revolutionary aspirations of modernization. What the victory involves—in the end—is the assertion by nations of their right to independence and by men and women of their right to freedom as they understand it.[29]

Populace and Resources Control

To the Communist insurgent leader, the population is a source of safety, food, money, medicine, intelligence, labor, weapons, equipment, and inspiration. The population is as necessary to the insurgent as water is to fish according to Mao. Much has been written about the amount of popular support needed by guerrillas in order to achieve

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[28]U.S., Department of State, "President Johnson's Trip to Asia," Department of State Bulletin, LV (November 14, 1966), 730-31.

[29]Walt W. Rostow, "Countering Guerrilla Attack," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin M. Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 467.

their goals or at least sustain their insurgency. One of the best of these studies was made by Ralph Sanders who concluded that popular support of a Communist insurgency generally followed a normal distribution curve with a few passionately supporting the Communists, a few staunchly opposing them, and most people attempting to ignore them.[30] Several military analysts estimate the guerrillas need the active support of 15 or 25 percent and the sympathy of another 40 percent.[31]

Another important element must be the lack of an organized resistance to the insurgent. The insurgent can accomplish his mission with a minimum of support, but he cannot tolerate any serious opposition among the people. Andrew C. Janos states this quite eloquently:

> More important than direct and active popular support is the neutrality of the majority in the struggle between the opposition and the government. Governments fall not because they have too many enemies but because they have too few friends.[32]

Since the population is a key element in the insurgent movement, any successful internal defense program must sever or at least seriously weaken the link between the insurgent and the populace. The guerrilla bands must be eliminated, and the social and economic ills that exacerbate the insurgency must be treated. According to Peter Paret and John W. Shy, counterguerrilla action (internal defense) may be separated into three major tasks that must be pursued simultaneously since success in one area depends on progress in the others. The tasks are: (1) the military defeat of the guerrilla forces, (2) the

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[30]Ralph Sanders, "Mass Support and Communist Insurrection," Orbis, IX (Spring, 1965), 220.

[31]Sanders, Orbis, IX, 220.

[32]Andrew C. Janos, The Seizure of Power (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1964), p. 20.

separation of the guerrilla from the population, and (3) the reestab-

lishment of governmental authority and development of a viable social

order.[33]

Current U.S. Army doctrine recognizes three major program

groupings comprising internal defense with intelligence and psycho-

logical operations vital parts of all three groupings. The three

programs are:

1. Counterguerrilla operations.

2. Populace and resources control.

3. Environmental improvement.[34]

Counterguerrilla operations are primarily military actions to destroy

or defeat organized insurgent forces. Environmental improvement is a

governmental program to improve the well-being and standard of living

of the people. This program is aimed at eliminating the social and

economic ills that are contributing factors to the insurgency and at

the same time gaining the support, loyalty, and respect of the people

for their government.[35]

According to the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command:

> Populace and resources control are actions undertaken by a
> government to control the populace and its material resources
> or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile
> aims and objectives against that government.[36]

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[33]Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New
York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 40-41.

[34]U.S., Department of the Army, Advisor Handbook for Counter-
insurgency, FM 31-73 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
April 1965), p. 10.

[35]FM 31-73, pp. 12-56.

[36]U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency,
Advisor Handbook for Internal Defense and Development FM 31-73, Initial
Draft Manuscript (Fort Bragg, N.C., October 1966), p. 246.

An analysis of this definition reveals two major tasks: control and denial. Inherent with these two tasks are the requirements to provide security to the population and its resources. If the guerrilla is going to be completely isolated, the government must prevent the population from going to the guerrilla as well as preventing the guerrilla from coming to the population. For purposes of discussion, it is convenient to subdivide the program into populace control and resources control. The objectives of populace control are: to prevent support of irregular forces by the populace; detect and eliminate underground elements of irregular forces within the population; prevent interference by the people with military operations; and counter terrorism and create an environment of order and security. Populace control includes:

1. Screening and documentation of the population.

2. Control of civilian movement.

3. Relocation of elements of the civilian populace from guerrilla areas.

4. Arrest and detention.

5. Search for and seizure of illegal items.

6. Resettlement of the populace into secure villages.

7. Security of key installations.

8. Border security and patrolling.

9. Control of riots and other civil disturbances.[37]

Resources control are actions taken to restrict the availability of materials valuable to the insurgent. Measures include:

1. Rationing.

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[37]FM 100-20, pp. 22-23.

2. Control of medical facilities and drugs.

3. Denial and destruction operations against insurgent installations, materials, and crops.

4. Control of livestock and raw materials.

5. Control of printing materials.

6. Control of weapons and munitions.

7. Establishment of restricted areas to deny access to unauthorized persons.[38]

For the purposes of this thesis, two additional elements will be included under the program of populace and resources control. These are area control and lines of communications security. Area control is important from the standpoint of evaluating the extent to which the insurgent has been able to establish his influence in a particular portion of the country. Lines of communications include: railroads, highways, waterways, and pipelines that are necessary for the economic functioning of the nation. Interdiction of these lines are prime missions of the insurgents in their campaign to isolate communities, exact taxes, and generally paralyze the routine functioning of the nation.

According to Sir Robert Thompson, "The government must show it is determined to win, otherwise it cannot instill the confidence that it is going to win."[39] Populace and resources control measures must contribute to winning, and this concept must be demonstrated to the

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[38]FM 31-73, pp. 39-40.

[39]Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 146.

populace. Otherwise, the harsh and restrictive nature of the controls will only further alienate the people from the government. Objectives must be established and then achievement evaluated. Some method is required to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures instituted, or their implementation may be useless and a waste of money, manpower, and time. The essential criterion of a populace and resources control measure is the contribution it makes to the overall effort. This contribution must be evaluated either precisely, or at worst, by considered judgment. Internal defense is a dynamic undertaking, and every action may have an impact on some other program or future operation. Populace and resources control measures are often in direct conflict with environmental improvement. For example, environmental improvement promotes the maximum free movement of people and exchange of merchandise to stimulate the economy. Populace and resources control restricts these. Knowledge of the effectiveness of control measures is essential, in order that decisions can be made regarding expansion or reduction of the program or increased emphasis on a particular measure. In a populace and resources control program, there are many measures that can be implemented. If one is ineffective, it should be eliminated and another implemented. In order to determine the effectiveness of these measures and requirements for additional ones, some sort of measuring technique is required. In this manner, only effective controls need be exercised, harassment will be at a minimum, and the overall objectives will be achieved.

CHAPTER II

THE COMMUNISTS LOSE IN GREECE

Greece Between the World Wars

Greece during the period between World War I and World War II

was fertile ground for the development of a revolution. The economy

was poorly developed, and the standard of living was one of the lowest

in Europe. The country was unable to establish a stable and democratic

government primarily as a result of a serious dispute between the two

major political parties concerning the status of the monarchy. Many

minority parties flourished during this period and actually held the

balance of political power. One of these, the Communist Party of

Greece (KKE), grew very rapidly and by World War II had developed a

country-wide organization.[1]

World War II

In November 1940, the country was united in the successful

defense against the Italian invasion. Greece's freedom was short-

lived, however, for Hitler invaded the Balkans, and on 29 May 1941,

Greece fell to the Nazis.

Several resistance groups were formed, the most important

being the National Liberation Front (EAM) composed of the KKE and

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[1]Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 1-5.

other leftist parties. ELAS, the Greek Liberation Army formed by EAM, won popular support and by the end of hostilities had monopolized the resistance movement.

When the Germans departed in October 1944, EAM was in virtual control of all Greece. Only the city of Athens and a small area dominated by a rightist resistance group were not within its complete jurisdiction.

The Communists had agreed earlier to participate in the "Government of National Unity" formed in exile, believing that seizure of power would be facilitated when the new government returned to Greece. The British recognized the danger of the imminent takeover, and on orders issued by Sir Winston Churchill, British troops accompanied the returning government in October 1944.[2] The Communists saw they would be unable to seize control of the government by legal means. On 3 December 1944, an attempt was made to gain power by armed revolt. The insurgents were quickly defeated by Greek and British forces, and the Communists signed the Varkiza Agreement ending the brief revolt; however, the Communist Party was legalized, and amnesty was granted to the insurgents who has participated in the rebellion.[3]

Developing the Insurgency

During 1945, the Communists consolidated their forces and refined their front organizations. With huge caches of weapons from the war, KKE was ready in early 1946 to launch another campaign to

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[2]Kousoulas, pp. 195-97.

[3]C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1951), pp. 308-10.

seize the country by force. As explained by Professor Kousoulas, Greece

in 1946 fit the insurgent's prescription for waging guerrilla war.

> (1) The non-Communist political parties were vehemently
> carrying on their feud around the issue of Constitutional
> Monarchy vs. Republic. (2) The people were bitterly disunited.
> (3) The Greek economy was ravaged after five years of war,
> occupation, and revolution. (4) The Civil Service, ill-paid
> and permeated by Communist sympathizers, was ineffective. The
> Greek Army was weakened by the infiltration of Communist agents,
> while it lacked both the organization and the experience to wage
> anti-guerrilla warfare.[4]

In March 1946, civil war began with attacks against isolated

gendarmerie posts. The insurgents' goals were to tie the army down,

cut communications, sow civil disorder, increase the tax burden and

disrupt the economic life of the country so as to create economic,

social, and political pressures that would bring about the collaspse

of the national government.[5]

Applying hit and run tactics, and with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,

and Albania furnishing sanctuary, the Communists were able to gain

control of the major portion of northern Greece and establish a sig-

nificantly large base area by the end of 1947.

The KKE revived the World War II organizations that had been

very effective, and through the facilities and cover of the Greek

Agrarian Party, established an effective infrastructure in the rural

villages. The traditional Communist hierarchy was established with

committees at village, district, prefectural, regional, and national

levels. A national judicial system was also instituted consisting of

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[4]Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, "The War the Communists Lost,"
Studies in Guerrilla Warfare (Menasha, Wis.: printed for U.S. Naval
Institute by George Banta & Co., 1963), pp. 83-84.

[5]Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (New York: Lyle Stuart,
1965), pp. 146-47.

People's Courts, Partisan Courts, and the Supreme Court. These courts

tried all types of offenses and, in the case of the Supreme Court,

issued decrees, laws, and orders.[6]

The most effective and important secret apparatus of the KKE

was the Aftoámyna or Self-Defense element. The task of Aftoámyna was

to infiltrate the Greek Armed Forces, perform espionage, commit acts

of terrorism and sabotage, and murder politicians and government offi-

cials who were considered particularly dangerous. The basic unit in

the village consisted of a committee of three who became the eyes and

ears of the Democratic Army (DAS). Aftoámyna also secured cattle, food,

housing, and recruits for DAS.[7]

The insurgents were able to inflict heavy damage on the Armed

Forces and the countryside. According to Kousoulas, between 1946 and

1949:

> The Greek Armed Forces, including the gendarmerie, suffered
> 16,753 dead, 40,398 wounded, 4,788 missing. In the same period
> the guerrillas burned 11,788 houses, destroyed 98 railroad sta-
> tions, derailed 96 trains, executed 4,123 civilians and carried
> out 1,611 major sabotage operations against bridges, tunnels, and
> railroad lines.[8]

Populace and Resources Control

The successes of the insurgents were probably due as much to

inefficiency on the part of the government as to the capabilities of

the Communists. The country remained politically divided throughout

the period of the insurgency. Seventeen different governments ruled

[6]F. A. Voigt, The Greek Sedition (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), pp. 181-82.

[7]Voigt, pp. 215-17.

[8]Kousoulas, Revolution . . . , 270.

Greece from 1945 through 1949.[9] All these governments recognized the dangers of the Communist conspiracy, but those prior to late 1948 were unable to deal with it effectively.

In June 1946, the Greek Parliment had authorized the establishment of military courts to try crimes against the security of the state and against public order and peace. The courts were first active in Macedonia where guerrilla activity was greatest. The courts were employed in additional areas as the insurgency increased.[10] Security Committees were established in every province and had the powers of indefinite detention and deportation without trial. The numbers of people arrested, sentenced, or deported were never announced by the government, so an official count is not available. The Communists claimed 26,000 of their followers were either in prison or in exile in February 1947. The government did release 12,000 political deportees in September 1947 under one of the many amnesty programs. Many thousands more were imprisoned, exiled, or executed later in the war. This measure proved very effective because it deprived DAS of the services of some of the greatest World War II guerrilla leaders.[11]

Legalized by the Varkiza Agreement, the KKE and its two newspapers operated in Athens with impunity until the fall of 1947. When the results of a Greek Communist meeting and an exhortation for all-out

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[9]L. S. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), p. 197.

[10]Voigt, p. 48.

[11]Frank Smothers, William H. McNeill, and Elizabeth D. McNeill, Report on the Greeks (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1948), pp. 35-48.

civil war was published in <u>Rizospastis</u>, the government took action, and
the papers were closed on 18 October 1947.[12] This deprived the insurgents of their main propaganda voices. Sold all over Greece, <u>Rizospastis</u>
and <u>Eleftheria</u> had carried party doctrine and instructions to the
remotest villages. After suppression, the papers continued to appear
clandestinely but had lost the greater part of their effectiveness.

With the announcement of the formation of the "Temporary Democratic Government" the Communist Party was outlawed in late December
1947. This allowed the government to arrest and detain known Communists and sympathizers for having been members of an illegal organization. The urban police, retrained by a British mission and using
documents and records seized in raids on Communist Party organs, were
able to neutralize the Communist underground in the cities. All
attempts to reestablish the <u>Aftoámyna</u> in Athens were defeated almost
instantaneously by these police employing modern police methods.[13]

In order to counter economic paralysis, the government outlawed
strikes in early December 1947.[14] The measure was not completely
effective; and each month unofficial strikes occurred, even under
threat of the death penalty to the strikers.

The EAM had gained control of the Greek labor movement in World
War II and had conducted successful strikes and slowdowns during the
German occupation. After the war, the government took action to eliminate Communist influence in labor by ordering the removal of union
leaders. This generated an anti-labor reputation for the government

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[12]<u>New York Times</u>, October 19, 1947, p. 50.

[13]Voigt, p. 13.   [14]<u>New York Times</u>, December 7, 1947, p. 1.

and was protested vigorously by the British Labor government. The urban population was generally sympathetic to the cause of labor, and since most of the strikes were not politically motivated, enforcement of the anti-strike rule was unpopular and was not aggressively practiced.

Rationing and price controls had been established in 1945 but were not effective. These measures were intended primarily to assure equal distribution of food and keep prices down rather than deny food to the rebels. The population did not cooperate, and a flourishing black market developed. Relief supplies donated to the government were sold to industrialists at low prices, and they in turn were allowed to make huge profits on the resale. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency rations distributed by the government were priced so high that poor peasants had to borrow money to buy them. The peasants in turn sold the sugar and other portions of the ration on the black market to repay the loan.[15] This forced prices to spiral and made the entire control mechanism ineffective. Transportation difficulties aggravated the problem, as extreme difficulty was encountered in moving items into the countryside. Often there was a surplus of supplies in city warehouses and yet a real famine in the rural areas.

Movement in the guerrilla zones was often restricted to military convoys to prevent the guerrillas from preying on travelers and to reduce the number of incidents resulting from civilian vehicles hitting mines.[16]

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[15]Smothers, MacNeill, and MacNeill, p. 76.

[16]Smothers, MacNeill, and MacNeill, p. 43.

The Greek Army was rapidly expanded in 1947 and 1948. One of the reasons for its lack of success had been the static nature of its operations. The vast majority of the Army had been tied down defending key villages and towns allowing the guerrillas to select their targets at will. A National Defense Corps was formed to relieve the Army of the protection mission and free it for offensive operations. A civilian militia was also trained and armed, giving the small villages a capacity to defend themselves. An effective strategy was evolved which included mass arrest and deportation of known Communists and sympathizers, evacuation and relocation of civilians from guerrilla areas, and the deployment of paramilitary forces in newly cleared areas.[17]

Prior to 1947, the Greek National Army had refused to accept recruits who had been members of Communist organizations or were sympathetic towards the guerrillas, fearing that politically unreliable recruits would later desert to the insurgents. Instead of sending these men to exile where they would be of little use to the government, they were sent to the Island of Makronisos where the government maintained an internment camp and rehabilitation center. Communists and sympathizers were given military training and indoctrinated with Greek history, culture, and traditions. About seven-tenths of those receiving the training became completely loyal to the National government, one-tenth remained confirmed Communists, and two-tenths supported neither side.[18] Many of those converted to the Nationalist cause were

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[17]Kousoulas, _Revolution . . . ,_ p. 259.

[18]Voigt, pp. 23-25.

inducted into the Greek Army and became some of its best fighters.[19]
A detention camp for confirmed Communists was maintained on the island
of Ikaria where the prisoners were given an allowance and permitted
freedom of the island but were required to report to the police every
day.[20]

As the war progressed, the need to separate the guerrillas from
the population became more apparent. A program of evacuation of vil-
lages in the rebel areas of northern Greece was begun in late 1947.
By the end of that year, 200,000 people had left their homes at the
government's direction or because of terrorist activities of the
rebels.[21] By the end of the war, over 750,000 people were displaced.
These programs were not very well managed, and the refugees lived mis-
erably in tents and straw huts. They had little food, and in most
cases, no means of livelihood or even forage for their farm animals.

It is remarkable that these camps were not exploited by the
Communists and did not become fertile guerrilla recruiting grounds.
This did not happen because the EAM was not able to establish popular
leaders in the camps due to a shortage of cadres. Also "the hardships
of seven years of war and famine had left most Greek peasants apathetic
towards armed conflict of any kind."[22]

A unique aspect of the relocation of the populace was the
decision by the government to evacuate children from the war zones.

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[19]New York Times, August 22, 1949, p. 4.   [20]Voigt, p. 19.

[21]New York Times, December 7, 1947, VI, p. 12.

[22]U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Internal
Defense Operations a Case History, Greece 1946-49, RB 31-1 (Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas: The Command and General Staff College, 1966),
p. 126.

This was in response to a Communist program which called for the resettlement of children in countries behind the Iron Curtain. The government evacuated almost 15,000 young children, but the Communists abducted over 23,000 and sent them to northern Communist countries.[23]

With advice and massive assistance from the United States under the Truman Doctrine, the takeover by the Communists was averted. Large scale economic assistance and relief supplies aided recovery, prevented economic chaos, and gave Greece hope. In 1948, the government began to institute effective measures against the insurgency. A civil mobilization plan, announced in March 1948, included the formal mobilization of noncombatants and the organization of industry on a war footing. After the murder of the Minister of Justice by terrorists, martial law was declared in Athens in May 1948.[24] It was later extended throughout the country in November 1948.

Martial law gave the government broad police powers to curb the terrorism that the EAM was promoting. The military courts were given wider jurisdiction and allowed to try all types of violations. The police were authorized to conduct searches without warrants. Military governors were appointed in various centers and were given authority to impose curfews.[25] Central Greece including Athens was subjected to a 1 A.M. to 5 A.M. curfew. With these measures, the military and police were able to halt the spread of terrorism.

By the fall of 1948, the government was conducting an effective

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[23]Voigt, pp. 15, 186-91.

[24]New York Times, May 3, 1948, p. 3.

[25]New York Times, October 30, 1948, p. 4.

campaign against the DAS. The Greek Navy sank a ship carrying 500 tons of arms and supplies to the rebels in the Peloponnesus, and maintained a five mile wide maritime restricted zone around the coastline during the Peloponnesus campaign. This blockade, coupled with the sealing of the isthmus at Corinth by the Army, resulted in the destruction of the DAS forces in that area during "Operation Pigeon" in the winter of 1948-49. The gendarmerie and metropolitan police uprooted the infrastructure by arresting all known Communists. Any person even remotely suspected of pro-Communist sympathies was removed to non-sensitive areas or placed in an internment camp.[26] The deployment of the National Defense Corps and militia prevented the return of the guerrillas. Effective patrolling by naval forces prevented reinfestation by sea. This was the beginning of a successful program that ended with the defeat of the guerrillas in October 1949.

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[26]Kousoulas, Studies in Guerrilla Warfare, p. 88.

CHAPTER III

THE HUKS FAIL IN THE PHILIPPINES

General Background

The Philippine Islands came under United States control as a
result of the 1899 treaty ending the war with Spain. The United States
took an active part in developing the economy, but local government was
left essentially to Filipinos. In 1935, the Philippines achieved
commonwealth status and began preparing for full independence scheduled
to be granted ten years later.

Although there was increased industrial development in the
urban areas, most of the population continued to live in the barrios
or rural villages. Here there were two classes—landlord and peasant.
The vast majority of the land was owned by a few rich families who
rented to peasant tenants on a crop-sharing basis. As the landlord
received half the crop, the peasant was not able to support his family
and had to resort to borrowing on future crops at usurious rates of
interest.[1] There was a great deal of unrest, and sporadic uprisings
occurred. These were poorly organized and never effectively challenged
the government or forced major social reforms.

The governmental structure aggravated the clash between peas-
ants and landlords. Government officials were almost exclusively

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[1]Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 84-85.

members of the upper class, and the barrios were almost completely

without any form of self-government. The barrios came under the direct

administration of the mayor and the municipal council, but these offi-

cials were residents of the municipal capital city and seldom visited

the barrios. Citizens of the barrios participated in the election of

the mayor and council but were not allowed to establish any local vil-

lage level administration.[2] The concentration of political power in

the hands of the rich further alienated the peasants from the central

government.

The Communist Party of the Philippines was formed officially

on 7 November 1930.[3] In 1932, the party was declared illegal, and

several of its leaders were imprisoned because of labor agitation. In

1938, the Communist party merged with the Socialist Party; and through

it, the Communists were able to continue the promotion of their objec-

tives. By 1941, the Communists had again achieved legal standing and

operated openly through their front organizations.[4]

World War II

After the fall of the Philippines to Japan in early 1942, the

Communists established the National Anti-Japanese Army named Hukbalahap,

or Huks, for short. The Huks operated in central Luzon and were an

effective force in fighting the Japanese occupation. Furnished arms by

the United States, the Huks deposited most of these weapons in secret

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[2]Scaff, p. 148.

[3]Uldanico S. Baclagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign (Manila:
M. Colcol & Co., 1960), p. 244.

[4]Scaff, p. 152.

caches to be used later in their drive against the government.[5] The

Huks were successful in gaining considerable popular support from the

Filipino peasants. The fight against the Japanese was a popular cause,

and some of the practices instituted by the Huks in the barrios

appealed to the poor farmers. Over 100,000 Filipinos became active

members or active supporters of the Huk movement.[6]

After liberation by American forces, the government attempted

to return the country to normalcy. The Huks were requested to turn in

their arms and disband which they refused to do. Communists elected to

the national legislature were denied their seats because of charges of

fraud and terrorism from their home provinces. Feeling that more could

be achieved by armed struggle, the Huks resorted to active guerrilla

warfare in May 1946.

By 1950, the Huks were in almost complete control of central

Luzon. Their clandestine organizations had infiltrated the Army,

Civil Service, Constabulary, and even high circles of government.

"Impressed by their own strength and encouraged by the failures of

government, the Huks decided that the time had come with the 1949

elections to make a bid for control of the Philippines."[7] The plans

called for seizure of Manila in 1950 by guerrillas and fifth-column

forces. The city would be burned by saboteurs to cover the infiltration

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[5]Thomas C. Tirona, "The Philippine Anti-Communist Campaign," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin M. Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 204.

[6]Scaff, p. 10.

[7]José Lava, "Twenty Years of Struggle of the Communist Party of the Philippines," pp. 21-22, cited by Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 154.

of the guerrillas. The years, 1951 and 1952, were to be the period of military expansion culminating in the seizure of national power.[8]

Huklandia

Four central Luzon provinces, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, and Bulacan, were under such a high degree of Communist control that the entire area was called Huklandia. Here the Huks levied taxes, ran schools, and maintained a group of agricultural production centers.[9] From the peasant barrios the Huks recruited personnel for their military forces and supporting organizations. All the government officials were secretly Huks or Huk sympathizers.

The controlling element of the movement was the Communist Central Committee composed of the leading members of the Communist Party. Immediately subordinate to the Central Committee were two Politburos. The Politburo-in, located in Manila, was the nerve center of the movement. The Politburo-out, located in central Luzon, directed field operations. Below the Politburos were the various functional committees for military, peasant, labor, and education affairs.[10]

To alleviate the problem of communications, the Huks employed an intricate network of messengers. These were usually young girls or boys who would not attract attention and could enter the government areas without difficulty. These couriers proved to be an "Achilles heel" of the guerrillas, however, for many who were caught, quickly

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[8]Tirona, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 205-06.

[9]Kenneth M. Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines," Military Review, XXXVI (April, 1956), 51.

[10]Scaff, pp. 33-34.

led government forces back to the Huk camps.

Populace and Resources Control Contribute to Victory

One of the major factors contributing to the Communist success was the failure of the central government to recognize the true character of the insurgency. The Communist Party had been declared illegal in the 1930s; and although known Communists were key members of the Huk movement, the insurgency was not widely regarded as being a serious threat. First attempts to destroy the insurgents emphasized military action. The government troops, poorly trained, underpaid, and infiltrated by Huks, were ineffective. They often shelled friendly barrios inflicting civilian casualties. The Constabulary was also guilty of mistreating prisoners and suspects. By these actions, the government troops turned the people against the government and strengthened the Huk movement. In March 1948, President Roxas declared the Huks and one of their fronts, the PKM (Confederation of Peasants), illegal and seditious. This declaration did not have the power of an executive order, but any member of the two organizations could be arrested and prosecuted.[11] After President Roxas' death, the new president, Quirino, decided on a policy of mediation and amnesty and did not enforce the anti-Communist action. Months were spent in negotiations with the Huks, but they eventually refused to participate in the amnesty program. Again the government had to resort to police action. After the many amnesty offers, the legal status of the Communist Party was again cloudy.

The government realized that many weapons had been distributed

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[11]New York Times, March 7, 1948, p. 25.

to guerrilla forces during the Japanese occupation. In the summer of 1946, a call was made for the turn-in or registration of all illegal weapons. It was estimated that 100,000 had been issued during the war, and of these, only seventy percent had been turned in. The deadline set for turn-in was 31 August 1946.[12] Needless to say, the Huks failed to comply.

During the post-war years, the government became more corrupt. In 1949, the administration resorted to violence and rigged the national elections to keep their party in power. The insurgency continued to grow; and by mid 1950, Manila was threatened by Huk attack. President Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay Defense Minister on 1 September 1950 and gave him a free hand in dealing with the insurgency.

Magsaysay's first step was the reorganization of the armed forces. He integrated the Constabulary and the Army and created a unified command under the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.[13] The country was divided into military area commands, and these were further sub-divided into sectors of one or more provinces. Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) consisting of infantry, heavy weapons, artillery, and recon-naissance elements were assigned to the sectors as required.[14] Emphasis was placed on decentralized operations. The BCTs were assigned the additional task of winning the support of the populace as well as defeating the Huks.

Magsaysay, a former World War II guerrilla leader, applied

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[12]New York Times, August 25, 1946, p. 29.   [13]Scaff, p. 36.

[14]Boyd T. Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War," Modern Guerrilla Warfare ed. Frank M. Osanka (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 197.

both conventional and guerrilla tactics against the Huks. He was able to install his secret agents in all echelons of the Huk Army (HMB), and in October 1950, only two months after his appointment, captured the major members of the "Politburo-in." This was accomplished by the use of informants and the surveillance of a Communist courier in the city of Manila. This deprived the Huks of their major command echelon and their primary source of funds and support. The Communists were never able to recover from this serious blow. To ensure that the suspects would not escape custody, President Quirino, by Presidential Order, suspended the right of habeas corpus for suspected saboteurs and persons charged with rebellion.[15] This permitted the government to keep guerrillas in custody for long periods before being brought to trial.

A new effort to collect illegal weapons was initiated. Approximately 60,000 were collected by paying a fee of seventy-five pesos for each weapon turned in.[16] This was many more than the government had estimated to be outstanding and showed the people's response to Magsaysay's appeal.

Magsaysay felt that a large majority of Huks did not embrace Communist doctrine but fought against the government to protest the great social ills prevalent at the time. He knew that the Filipino peasant had one great attachment—land. Magsaysay revived a dormant resettlement program and offered land to surrendered Huks, believing that this would dramatically depict the government's interest and

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[15] _New York Times_, October 23, 1950, p. 7.

[16] U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, _Internal Defense Operations a Case History, The Philippines 1946-54_, RB 31-3 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Command and General Staff College, 1966), p. 61.

sincerity. The Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) was established 1 December 1950 under the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines.[17] EDCOR offered land to surrendered or captured dissidents, ex-servicemen, ex-guerrillas and other Filipino citizens. Although only a few hundred Huks took advantage of the program, it captured the imagination of the people and robbed the Communists of a major propaganda theme. The Huks were not approached directly and offered land, but the program was well publicized among the civilian population in Huk areas. The net result was that many civilians felt that they should not be asked to support guerrillas who could get free land and a government loan only for the asking. The Huks scoffed at the program and called it a trick, but reports from the resettlement areas showed that the program was factual. Many Huks surrendered or faded back into a peaceful country life because they had come to doubt the propaganda of their own leaders.[18]

In order to plant distrust among the Huks and to speed the flow of intelligence, a graduated scale of awards for capture or for information leading to the capture of Huk leaders was instituted. "Rewards ranged from a high of $65,000 down."[19] This system of rewards motivated the civilians who were not Huk supporters to become informants and forced the Huk leaders to restrict their movements to those areas where their safety was assured. The rewards also generated doubts among the Huk leaders, as they never knew if one of their followers would attempt to collect the reward.

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[17]Scaff, p. 154. [18]USACGSC, RB 31-3, p. 74.

[19]Bashore, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, p. 199.

The major task of defeating the Huks was assigned to the BCTs in the Sector Commands. They applied ingenuity, enthusiasm, and dedication and were more than equal to the task. One of their most difficult problems was distinguishing Huks from loyal peasants in barrios sympathetic to the Huks. The most successful measure used was to pre-publicize an operation in a barrio and then photograph all of the inhabitants. Since advance notice of the operation had been given, all of the Huks had disappeared into the jungle. These photographs were used in subsequent operations to verify that those photographed still remained in the barrio. The pictures were also useful in detecting strangers who had recently moved into the barrio. Ninety percent of the suspects picked up on this basis were found to be Huks or sympathizers.[20] Similar methods were adopted by other BCTs. One BCT screened the population against the current order of battle and personality file during operations and marked the hands of those cleared with a rubber stamp. Although not very permanent, the inkmark persisted for the duration of the operation.[21] These methods illustrate some of the techniques that the BCTs used in population screening. Rather crude and completely decentralized, they were adequate to accomplish the requirement when used in conjunction with information from informants and other intelligence sources. It became increasingly difficult for the Huks to move from one barrio to another without being detected and compromised.

Curfews were not imposed throughout the country but were used

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[20]Baclagon, 31.

[21]Luis A. Villa-Real, "Huk Hunting," Combat Forces Journal, IV (November, 1954), 35.

on a selective basis. Twenty-one towns in Pompanga Province were

subjected to a 10:00 P.M. curfew as early as 1946, in an attempt to

reduce acts of terrorism.[22] Since almost all the Huk activity was

concentrated in the barrios in the rural areas, there was little need

for the imposition of curfews, as there was little or no movement out-

side the barrios at night. Also due to the remoteness of many of the

barrios, enforcement of a curfew was almost impossible.

Food was not rationed, but limits were imposed on the amounts

that could be purchased. No civilian could purchase more food than

his family could consume in one week.[23] William J. Pomeroy, an American

member of the Huks, described the effectiveness of this measure:

> It is the purchase of food that bothers us. We are a camp of
> 200 people with a major supply problem. When the enemy begin their
> systems of limiting purchases in market places, our organization in
> the town devises a system of counteracting it, going to each family
> and collecting a ganta of rice apiece from their weekly quota. It
> is something, but it is not enough; our ration of rice is cut in
> half and we take up notches in our belts.[24]

Raids and operations were conducted into the "liberated areas"

forcing the Huks to abandon their "production bases" which they had

used to produce some of their own food. Kept on the run, the only

remaining source of food was the barrios. In some cases, the Huks

raided these barrios for food causing the Huks to lose more popular

support.

·The Army, through intelligence agents, maintained surveillance

over stores that sold mimeograph machines and printing supplies forcing

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[22]New York Times, July 14, 1946, p. 14.

[23]William J. Pomeroy, The Forest (New York: International
Publishers, 1963), p. 168.

[24]Pomeroy, p. 169.

the Huks to resort to raids on government agencies in order to get printing equipment.[25] This seriously affected the flow of Communist propaganda, as almost all their publications were mimeographed. This simple measure greatly reduced the output of Communist propaganda and seriously handicapped their recruiting effort.

Many areas were cordoned off with road patrols and numerous checkpoints. This was done to restrict guerrilla movement and to prevent the insurgents from obtaining food.[26] This program was very effective and included many additional measures to keep insurgents from entering the barrios. Some of these were the construction of tall watchtowers; clearing of tall grass near inhabited areas; and the leveling and smoothing of soil by bulldozers to make footprints noticeable.[27] The success of these measures was dependent on the availability of sufficient troops to man the towers and patrol nearby areas. These measures were instituted at a time when the Huks had been reduced to small ineffective bands and government troops were at their peak efficiency.

No militia or self-defense forces were formed for protection of the barrios against Huk attack. This task was left to the Constabulary, BCTs, and Sector Commands who also conducted offensive operations. There was not a great need for self-defense forces, as the numbers of regular forces and Constabulary were sufficient to accomplish defense.

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[25]Pomeroy, p. 145.

[26]Villa-Real, Combat Forces Journal, IV, 35.

[27]Pomeroy, p. 210.

The many faceted programs instituted by Magsaysay soon reduced the insurgency to controllable dimensions. By the end of 1952 the Huks had been routed, and only small ineffective bands remained. The government had destroyed the native Communist underground apparatus by the effective use of intelligence and police work. To rid the country of any vestige of Communist influence, the government in December 1952 arrested and deported Chinese members of Communist party organizations.[28] It was not until 19 June 1957, however, that the Philippine Communist Party was formally outlawed by legislative statute.[29]

Credit for defeating the insurgency must be given to Magsaysay. He recognized the problem and aggressively instituted the required actions to defeat the Communists. He combined all the various countermeasures into a single integrated program, and achieved victory in a comparatively short time.

[28]New York Times, December 20, 1952, p. 3.

[29]Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom 1946-1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 245

CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH WIN IN MALAYA

Prewar Malaya

Situated at the crossroads of Southeast Asia, Malaya has been
subjected to European colonialism for over 400 years. Portuguese
traders followed by Dutch and later British merchants established
settlements and military bases to protect trade routes to the Far
East. The British, through their naval power, were able to dominate
the area; and by the close of the eighteenth century had become the
most influential foreign power. In order to develop trading bases,
the British leased the island of Penang on a perpetual lease in 1784,
purchased Singapore in 1819, and received the seaport of Malacca from
Holland in 1824.[1] The entire Malay peninsula eventually came under
British control through negotiations with the sultan rulers of the
nine Malay states. The sultans agreed to accept British direction in
all matters except religion and Malay customs and so continued to main-
tain a large amount of prestige and some voice in the affairs of
government.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Malaya had become
deeply involved in world commerce. Two valuable commodities, tin and

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[1]Lennox A. Mills, Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 3.

rubber, were available in huge quantities; and the development of these two products accelerated economic development.

The extraction of tin and the cultivation of rubber generated a large demand for labor. Hearing of the shortage of manpower, Chinese and Indian immigrants came to Malaya in great numbers in search of employment, hoping to become rich and later return to their homeland. These two groups had become significant parts of the population by World War II but remained isolated from each other and from the native Malays. Each group established a separate society, and there was very little interchange among the three groups.

Because of the interests and aims of the Chinese, very little political awareness was noted in their community. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had been formed in 1930 by Chinese immigrants but found very little acceptance due to competition with the many Chinese secret societies and social organizations. In the mid 1930s, the party was reorganized into the traditional central committee, secretariat, and subordinate bureaus. It was strengthened and made more effective through the development of front organizations but still did not achieve significant power.[2]

World War II

The outbreak of World War II gave the MCP a needed opportunity to become an influential organization. When Britain and Russia became allies, the MCP was instructed to assist the British in the war against the Japanese in as many ways as possible, including the conduct of

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[2]Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 60-62.

guerrilla warfare. Prior to the fall of Singapore, 200 Communist guerrillas were trained in a British secret school and subsequently became the core of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) of some 7,000 men organized in eight regiments.[3] The British supported the guerrillas throughout the war by air-drop and submarine, but most of the arms and ammunition furnished were deposited in secret caches. Although the MPAJA never posed a serious threat to the Japanese, it did become widely known to the population through its civilian support organization, the Malay People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU), which collected funds, food and supplies, recruited personnel, and distributed propaganda for the MPAJA.

During the occupation, the Japanese were very harsh in their treatment of the Chinese. Communities were uprooted, jobs were unavailable, and many Chinese families were unable to obtain sufficient food in the cities and towns. Tens of thousands of Chinese moved to the edges of the jungle where they cleared small patches and became farmers. Almost all these squatters were Chinese aliens who were ineligible to own land, but land belonging to the sultans was plentiful near the jungles, and the squatters took advantage of it.[4]

Communist Preparations

The Japanese capitulation came unexpectedly, and the MPAJA emerged from the jungles as triumphant liberators. In the time-lag between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of British troops, the

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[3] Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long Long War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 15.

[4] Mills, pp. 51-52.

MPAJA attempted to gain political control in some areas and began a program of confiscating "enemy" properties and punishing "collaborators."[5] Riots between Chinese and Malays errupted in some areas, and a feeling of distrust developed between the two races.

The MPAJA was disbanded shortly after the reestablishment of British administration, but many of the Communists refused to accept the veteran's gratuity offered by the British preferring instead to keep their names off government rolls.

To keep contact with its wartime guerrillas, the MCP formed the Ex-Service Comrades Association consisting of veterans of the MPAJA. Many other groups were formed, and schools were sponsored to exploit the revolutionary fervor that the Communists believed was developing in Malaya. They concentrated on the labor movement, emphasizing the use of agitation and strikes. "In the Federation alone during 1947 there were 360 strikes, 280 of which were on rubber plantations."[6] Using their regular techniques, Communists infiltrated and reorganized many labor movements. By 1948, the Communists had gained control of over sixty percent of the labor unions.[7]

After returning from a Communist conference held in Calcutta during February 1948, the Communists decided to switch from labor agitation to armed revolt.[8] A revolutionary plan developed which had the following three main objectives:

(1) to dislocate the Malayan economy by attacks on plantations and mines, many of which bordered the jungle; (2) to establish

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[5]Pye, p. 71. [6]Mills, pp. 45-46. [7]Mills, p. 45.

[8]J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1962), pp. 270-71.

"liberated areas" under their control; and (3) to lead a popular revolt in the form of a "liberation army" which would link the liberated areas and complete the conquest of Malaya.[9]

The MPAJA was revived into a force later called the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) and the MPAJU became the Min Yuen. Sensing great popular support, the Communists initiated their bid to take control by force in June 1948 by resorting to a series of coordinated acts of terrorism throughout the country.

The Emergency

The MRLA employed small-scale raids, murders, robbery, sabotage, terrorism, and ambushes against the government security forces in order to completely undermine the government and discredit it with the people. Special targets were the rubber and tin industries. Thousands of rubber trees were slashed and key personnel in the tin mines were marked for assassination in order to cripple these vital industries and enhance the economic paralysis. Although many Chinese workers were killed by terrorists, production was not materially affected.

The British administration had quickly recognized the seriousness of the outbreaks and declared a state of emergency on 18 June 1948 in the Federation and extended it to Singapore on 24 June.[10] Special laws called Emergency Regulations were quickly passed by the Federal Legislature to provide a legal basis for actions necessary to control the insurgency and maintain law and order.

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[9]J. M. Gullick, Malaya (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 97.

[10]Mills, p. 52.

The Emergency Regulations gave state and district governments broad powers in dealing with the insurgency and were aimed at curbing both the armed guerrillas and their underground support organization, the Min Yuen. The Regulations were used extensively throughout the insurgency and were key factors in the defeat of the Communists.

Probably the most significant requirement of the regulations was for the registration and screening of the population.[11] All persons over the age of twelve were forced to register at their local police stations. Photographs and thumbprints were taken and placed on an identity card to be carried by every individual. A copy of the card was maintained at the local police station as a ready reference and formed part of each individual's permanent record maintained by the police. These cards became an indispensable item for every citizen. Cards were required to purchase food, travel from one place to another, and to obtain any government service.[12] Periodic inspections by the police were conducted usually during curfew hours to ensure everyone was registered and no unauthorized persons had moved into the area. Many Communists were reluctant to be photographed and fingerprinted, and by failing to report for registration, cast suspicion upon themselves. The program was violently attacked by the Communists; cards were stolen and destroyed in an attempt to disrupt the system. Rubber workers were extremely vulnerable to the guerrilla depredations; so wooden tallys were issued to the workers, and their cards were maintained in a secure place during the time the workers were out among the rubber trees.[13]

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[11]Clutterbuck, p. 37.   [12]Clutterbuck, p. 38.

[13]Clutterbuck, p. 37.

This identity system contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Communists, for it prevented them from circulating freely among the population and made the disappearance of individuals quickly known to the officials. Guerrillas were unable to live among the people, and anyone caught outside his home area was immediately suspect. The identity card requirements frustrated recruiting and greatly reduced the free movement of couriers—the heart of the guerrilla communications system. Those Communists who failed to register were forced to remain completely out of populated areas or be subjected to immediate arrest by the police.

Curfews were established to keep movement at night to a minimum. Curfews were imposed by state officials as required and generally lasted from early evening till dawn the following morning.[14] The curfews were lengthened in special cases and sometimes amounted to virtual house restriction. A good example happened in the small city of Tanjong Malim, a district capital, where a curfew was imposed for twenty-two hours per day.[15] People were allowed out of their homes only two hours daily to purchase food. This curfew remained in effect for thirteen days and was one of the penalties of collective punishment imposed when a city or village aided the enemy and refused to cooperate with the government authorities.[16] On other occasions residents were ordered to remain in their homes for periods of three or four days when combat operations were conducted nearby.

British military forces reacted immediately to Communist attacks and were successful in preventing the establishment of insurgent

[14]Clutterbuck, p. 116. [15]Mills, p. 65. [16]Clutterbuck, p. 82.

base areas. The guerrillas were forced to move deep into the jungle in order to escape annihilation, however, they continued their hit and run attacks and the reign of terror over the Chinese squatters. By the middle of 1950, the situation had reached a stalemate; and neither side appeared to be able to make significant gains on the other.

The Briggs Plan

As a result of a detailed study of the squatter problems and their relationships with the insurgents, the government instituted the Briggs plan in June 1950. This plan had the ultimate goal of defeating the Communist insurgency through the implementation of an integrated internal defense program. The Briggs plan had four specific objectives. These were to: (1) provide security to the populated areas in order to achieve an increased flow of information, (2) eliminate the underground within the population, (3) prevent contact between guerrillas and their food supply sources, and (4) force the guerrillas to come out into open terrain where they could be engaged by security forces.[17] The heart of the program involved the resettlement of Chinese squatters living on the fringes of the jungles. The squatters were being exploited by the guerrillas who relied on them for food, supplies, intelligence, and recruits. Since almost every village was under the dominance of the MRLA, effective police protection for the loyal Chinese in the villages was impossible. By resettling the squatters, effective government control could be regained; and the guerrillas

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[17]Ralph L. Muros, "Communist Terrorism in Malaya," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare (Menasha, Wis.: Printed for the United States Naval Institute by George Banta Co., Inc., 1963), p. 66.

would be denied the major source of their support.

The resettlement was begun in June 1950 and took several years to complete. Over 550 new villages had to be built and over 500,000 people resettled.[18] The government attempted to persuade people to move voluntarily to the new villages but used force when necessary to make the squatters move. The new villages offered a much better life for the poor Chinese. Agricultural assistance, community centers, village schools, piped water, and electricity were furnished in addition to a thirty year lease on a small farm suitable for the squatters.[19] Most of the new villages were surrounded by a double perimeter fence separated by a fifteen yard gap which was patrolled at night. In villages near the jungle, the perimeters were lighted with floodlights. Each village had a police station and a contingent of Home Guards recruited from the inhabitants. Used primarily for guard duty, over 250,000 men were enrolled in the Home Guard throughout Malaya at the height of the insurgency.[20] Paid only for the time spent on duty, the Home Guard performed a vital function by protecting the new villages against guerrilla attack.

Two additional supplementary forces were organized by the government. Special Constables performed as auxiliary police handling guard duty on rubber estates, making periodic road, gate and food checks, and patrolling within their areas of responsibility. Over

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[18]Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 56.

[19]Mills, p. 56.

[20]Noll (pseud.), "The Emergency in Malaya," The Army Quarterly, LXVII (April, 1964), 50.

42,000 Special Constables augmented the regular police and helped
greatly in isolating the guerrillas in rural districts.[21]

The Police Field Force was organized to patrol the border, and
under an agreement with Thailand, had authority to conduct operations
into Thai territory within specified limits.[22] This measure prevented
Southern Thailand from becoming a major sanctuary for the insurgent
forces. The Police Field Forces also manned "jungle forts" deep in
the jungles where they established schools, trading posts, and medical
clinics. These posts were used to gain control of the aborigine tribes
who were being victimized by Communist terrorists. Highly successful,
these "forts" attracted the tribesmen to the government side and re-
moved them from their prior role of assisting the insurgents.

Food Denial

One of the most effective resources control programs implemented
by the government was food denial. Guerrillas continued to obtain food
from the villages by establishing food caches nearby and having the Min
Yuen smuggle out small quantities at a time and place it in the caches.
Food denial was conducted in conjunction with counterguerrilla opera-
tions and was aimed at eliminating the caches and forcing the guer-
rillas to come out of the jungles in search of food.

When an area was to be subjected to a food denial program, the
state officials declared the amount of rice and other foodstuffs that
each individual was allowed to possess. Wholesale and retail shops

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[21]Noll, The Army Quarterly, LXVII, 51.

[22]Noll, The Army Quarterly, LXVII, 53.

were subjected to stockage levels dictated by the state.[23] Many retail outlets were closed, and the remainder were placed under close surveillance. In one case, General Templar, the Director of Operations, personally directed the closing of twenty-one shops in a single village.[24] Items such as rice, rice products, sugar, cooking oil, dried, and canned foods were declared restricted items. Having these items in one's possession during curfew hours was a serious violation, and violators were subject to severe penalties. Shops were required to keep detailed records of the sales of these items and were liable to punishment of illegal sales were made. Nonperishable items were to be used immediately. In the case of tinned food, the cans were punctured at the time of sale.[25] In addition to these measures, ambushes were laid at known food caches; villages were closely patrolled; and every person entering or leaving was closely searched for restricted items. Usually after a few months, the guerrillas in the area surrendered or were killed or captured attempting to obtain food.[26]

Once the guerrilla was denied food from the villages, actions were taken to prevent him from growing crops in small patches deep in the jungles. Able to locate these clearings by aerial photography, destruction with chemical agents became a simple matter.[27] Two methods

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[23]E. H. Adkins Jr., The Police and Resources Control in Counterinsurgency (Saigon: U.S. Operations Mission to Vietnam, 1964), p. 165

[24]New York Times, February 21, 1954, p. 32.

[25]Adkins, p. 145.   [26]Clutterbuck, pp. 116-21.

[27]Vernon Bartlett, Report From Malaya (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 67.

were used. Helicopters equipped with spray tanks were flown over the
clearings and made short work of the destruction. Commodore Warcup, a
former RAF commander in Malaya, describes the use of helicopters for
this purpose:

> Helicopters were also important . . . for cropspraying. In
> the early years of the Emergency the CT's (Communist Terrorists)
> cultivated their own food crops which on the whole were quickly
> spotted by the army air reconnaissance aircraft. We liked to
> deal with these by spraying the crops with poison, but in a cold
> war this sort of action has its hazards. On one occasion a whole
> area of young rubber was sprayed by mistake. The claim for
> damages was so high it made this type of operation somewhat
> unpopular.[28]

The other method was destruction by hand spray by foot patrols or air-
borne troops who parachuted into the clearings.[29]

Immediate results of food denial were not forthcoming. Only
after the guerrillas had exhausted all their reserve supplies, did
they become bold enough to venture out where the security forces could
engage them. Used in conjunction with counterguerrilla operations,
food denial made an invaluable contribution to the defeat of the insur-
gents.

Other Measures

Another program, strictly enforced and related to food denial,
was movement control. Certain areas were designated "restricted" and
required special passes issued by the police for entrance. Most of
these areas were near the jungle hideouts of known or suspected guer-
rilla bands. A system of static and mobile checkpoints was established

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[28]Rand Corporation, Symposium on the Role of Airpower in
Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency,
Report RM-3651-PR (Santa Monica Calif.: Rand Corp., 1963), p. 39.

[29]New York Times, March 7, 1954, p. 4.

along the highways in these areas. All traffic was processed through the checkpoints. Vehicles were searched for restricted goods, and identity cards were checked. Waterways were also controlled; fishermen and boats were subjected to the same intense control as that found along the highways. These checks added to the isolation of the guerrillas and greatly increased the difficulty of exercising the freedom of movement that the insurgents required to be successful.

The legal requirements for a warrant to search private property were also suspended. Unannounced searches conducted by the military and by police greatly restricted the insurgents capability to establish small supply dumps and propaganda centers within the populated areas. Possession of an unauthorized weapon was punishable by death; and if convicted, the penalty was mandatory. The death sentence was prescribed for several other offenses but was not imposed if the offenders cooperated with the authorities and assisted in capturing other guerrillas. This amnesty gave officials a favorable bargaining position in dealing with captured or surrendered guerrillas. In numerous instances, amnesty was exchanged for information and cooperation.

In many cases, proof that known guerrillas or subversives had committed a crime could not be obtained. Witnesses refused to testify, and very little concrete evidence was available for presentation in court. In such cases, the police used the powers of arrest and detention without trial to keep these persons in prison. Since persons charged with violations against the Emergency Regulations were not allowed freedom on bail, insurgent suspects could be kept in permanent custody. To prevent abuse, a review board was established which

examined each case at regular intervals and heard appeals.[30]

Several rehabilitation centers were established for captured Communists and detainees. An eight month training course was administered in which manual skills and social studies were taught in an effort to make the Communist a useful citizen. The success of the program is shown by the fact that less than one percent of those who completed the program and were released later came to the attention of the police for political activity.[31]

The British and Malayan administration took effective action to control the activities of known Chinese Communists, agitators, and sympathizers. By removing these persons, the Communist leadership was denied many of its best workers and low level leaders. The MCP was declared illegal in June 1948; and in the following month, all the known party members were arrested.

Since the vast majority of the Chinese were not Malayan citizens, action was taken to deport the most undesirable aliens. These were the Chinese who were considered dangerous to the state and had engaged in some form of guerrilla activity. Under this program, 26,000 Chinese were returned to Communist China from Malaya.[32]

The Communists never gained or attempted to gain significant outside support. Naval forces patrolled the coastal waters, and the Police Field Force watched the Thai border, but the insurgents preferred to obtain all their supplies locally.

As a broad control measure, a system of designating the degree

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[30]Clutterbuck, p. 38.   [31]Bartlett, p. 49.

[32]Bartlett, p. 32.

of guerrilla infestation in various locations was developed. Areas were generally categorized as either "black" or "white." Black areas had significant guerrilla activity and were subjected to the full force of the Emergency Regulations. However, once an area was cleared of guerrillas and the infrastructure destroyed, it was classified "white." All curfews, restrictions on movements, food rationing, and the barbed wire fences were removed in "white" areas. This approach provided strong motivation to the citizenry to help eliminate the guerrillas. Achievement of the designation of "white" was marked by a special ceremony and was a time of rejoicing for the residents, for communism was no longer a danger in their area.[33]

In 1957, the guerrillas were still operating; but the threat had been reduced to manageable proportions. Some areas were still black; but through the coordinated efforts of the military and police forces, the majority of the country had become secure and prosperous again.

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[33]Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 213.

CHAPTER V

FRANCE AND THE ALGERIAN REBELLION

The Rebellion

France's influence in Algeria began in 1830 when a military

expedition landed in Algiers to punish the Moslem governor for striking

the French consul.[1] The French forces remained and over the next fifty

years slowly expanded their control by defeating the coastal Arabs and

the fierce Berber tribesmen in the interior. Settlers or colons

migrated from France, Spain, and Italy. By the beginning of the twen-

tieth century, these Europeans had gained control of the coastal strip

that contained the most fertile farmland in Algeria.[2] The colons

assumed the leading roles in the economic development and administra-

tion of the country and formed an elite social class. Arabs were

relegated to menial jobs and farmed the poorest land. Many were

employed on the large estates of the colons at very low wages. Algeria

prospered, but for the most part, the benefits were restricted to the

small European minority.

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[1]Michael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 14-16.

[2]Special Operations Research Office (SORO), Case Book on
Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (Washington:
American University, 1962), p. 235.

The exact legal status of Algeria was never clearly established. Regarded as an "extension of France," Europeans automatically achieved French citizenship, but Moslems were "subjects" who were required to renounce Islamic cannon law regarding marriage and divorce before becoming eligible for French citizenship.[3] Very few Arabs were prepared to take this action, and so the vast majority of the Algerian population did not enjoy the full benefits of French citizenship.

Throughout the period of French control, scattered movements promoting a greater voice and increased rights for the Arabs had appeared within the Moslem populace. These movements were violently opposed and effectively blocked by the colons. Military force was used on several occasions to put down tribal revolts in the drive to repress Arab political development. Frustrated by the lack of progress being made on the political front, nine militant members of a liberal Moslem political party formed the Comité Revolutionnaire Pour L'Unité et L'Action (CRUA) in July 1954, believing that armed resistance alone could dramatize the political problems sufficiently.[4] In the latter part of October 1954, the group changed its name to Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and set 1 November 1954 as the beginning of an armed uprising.

The insurgents realized they could never muster sufficient power to drive out the French; but they felt that by exerting enough pressure, France would be forced to grant independence to Algeria. The FLN hoped to internationalize the Algerian situation by hearings in the United Nations and planned to form close ties with nearby Arab

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[3]Clark, p. 25.   [4]SORO, p. 237.

States.

The specific goal of the FLN was:

National independence through: (1) the restoration of the
Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the
framework of the principles of Islam; (2) the preservation of
all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religion.[5]

The revolt began on schedule with seventy simultaneous acts of
terrorism at varied locations across the country. The rebellion was
particularly savage, as terrorism was the major weapon of the rebels.
Murder, kidnapping, and mutilations became commonplace, and the vic-
tims were Arabs as well as Europeans.

The FLN was comprised wholly of Algerian nationalists, and the
movement was a genuinely indigenous one although it received substan-
tial outside support. The Algerian Communist Party attempted to join
the FLN as a participating party but was rebuffed by the insurgents;
however, Communists were allowed to join as individuals.[6]

French Response

Five months after the outbreak of the rebellion, the French
National Assembly adopted a "State of Emergency Declaration" for
Algeria after a stormy debate in the National Assembly. Scheduled to
remain in effect for six months, the measure gave officials power to:
(1) ban the movement of vehicles and persons within certain areas at
certain times, (2) establish protection and security zones, (3) make
persons living in such zones subject to special controls, and (4)
expel from the department any person seeking to impede the actions of
the authorities.[7] The Governor General was empowered to relocate

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[5]Clark, p. 112.   [6]Clark, pp. 320-29.   [7]Clark, pp. 142-43.

persons, close public establishments of all types, and impound certain arms and ammunition. Night searches were authorized, and measures to control the press, radio, cinema and theatre were legalized. Military courts were given wider jurisdiction over certain crimes. Infractions of the Emergency Measures were made liable to prison terms of two months and a 200,000 franc ($630) fine.[8]

During the first fifteen months of the rebellion, the French Army employed conventional warfare tactics against the guerrillas regarding the insurgency as just another native uprising. However, French commanders soon learned that armored and mechanized forces were no better adapted to fighting a counterguerrilla war in Algeria than they had been in Vietnam. The vast firepower of modern weapons employed by the French was often indiscrimately employed and further alienated more and more Moslems. Law and order broke down, and the lack of severe penalties coupled with involved administrative procedures made the Emergency Measures less effective. Many guerrillas captured were released for lack of evidence. Describing this problem Kraft states:

> Even when suspects were rounded up, moreover, there was rarely any means of establishing guilt. The Army killed thousands of innocent individuals and destroyed hundreds of homes that never harbored a rebel. On the other hand, there was no legal means of detaining suspects. General Cherviere complained regularly of having to recapture, "arms in hand, rebels released by the courts for lack of proof."[9]

In spite of the large number of French forces committed, the Algerian rebels continued to gain ground.

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[8]Clark, p. 143.

[9]Joseph Kraft, The Struggle for Algeria (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961), p. 94.

The French officials recognized the seriousness of the situation and decided to take more strenuous action to check the insurgency. The Special Powers Act, adopted 12 March 1956, gave the government almost unlimited latitude to take whatever measures were necessary to preserve public order. The Emergency Powers authorization was extended indefinitely, and the number of French troops in Algeria was raised to 400,000.[10]

Pacification

With more authority and troops, a new program of pacification was begun in the summer of 1956. A _quadrillage_ or vast system of small military garrisons dispersed throughout the country was established. The _Sections Administratives Specialisees_, or SAS, were the backbone of the quadrillage program and controlled the system of rural administration. The rural areas were divided into sectors and districts with a SAS officer in charge. The garrisons were designed to furnish protection to the people, and the SAS was directed to stimulate the local economy and improve the well-being of the people by generating civic action projects and paying for local labor. Jobs were furnished to the unemployed, and wells, roads, and marketplaces were constructed.[11] Mobile, regular forces were used to hunt down and destroy guerrilla bands.

The system of garrisons did not prevent isolated attacks by the guerrillas, but the guerrillas' attempts to take over a large section of the country were thwarted. The mobile forces, freed of static security duties, were able to saturate the countryside with

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[10]Kraft, p. 94.   [11]Clark, p. 146.

operations and forced the insurgents to fragment their forces into small groups. The work of the SAS was very successful, as it brought an effective local administration to the rural Arabs.

To reduce guerrilla movement, curfews were established in the towns and villages, and no travel was allowed in the countryside from sunset to sunrise. Native caravans were required to follow directed routes. Security zones were established within which all civilians were prohibited, and the military was allowed to shoot anything that moved within these zones.[12] Since it was impossible to station troops in every remote village, many villages without French influence became support bases for the insurgents. To remove this support and furnish government protection for the populace, a major program of resettlement was begun. The entire populations of many remote villages were removed to areas adjacent to military garrisons. The vacated villages were destroyed, and the area was usually declared a security zone. By the end of the war, over 1,500,000 persons had been resettled; another 500,000 had fled to refugee camps in and out of Algeria.[13] The removal of the local populace allowed the military forces to conduct counter-guerrilla operations without interference from civilian inhabitants, and the concentration of the population near military garrisons facilitated government control and defense.

Once the population was resettled in defendable areas, a self-defense force was recruited. Called "Auto Defense Groups," these platoons were armed with hunting weapons because the French commanders

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[12]SORO, p. 258.

[13]Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 45.

were afraid of desertions and loss of weapons to the insurgents. By

the end of the war, some 2,000 groups with a strength of 60,000 had

been formed and were effectively guarding their villages against

attacks.[14]

The problem of detaining known insurgents or suspects was

solved with the 1956 authorization to establish internment camps.

Screening camps referred those that could be convicted for guerrilla

activities to trial in the civilian or military courts. Those that

were innocent were released, and those that were considered dangerous

but could not be found guilty because of lack of evidence were sent to

one of ten internment camps.

In these camps, psychological techniques modeled after Com-

munist "brainwashing" procedures were practiced in an attempt to in-

still loyalty to France in the Moslems. The total number of prisoners

officially acknowledged in these camps averaged about 8,000, but many

reporters estimate there were far more.[15]

The degree of success of these camps cannot be established

precisely. One source claimed that in a camp for political and mili-

tary officers of the rebellion, fifty percent rallied to the French

cause, ten percent rejoined the FLN, and forty percent remained neu-

tral.[16] However, the outcome of the Algerian conflict and the situations

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[14]William F. Malone, "Unconventional War" (unpublished student
thesis, U.S. Army War College, 1962), p. 41.

[15]Paret, p. 63.

[16]M. Déon, L'Armee de Algérie et la Pacification, p. 111,
cited by Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to
Algeria (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 65.

that existed in the camps make these figures seem overly exaggerated.[17]

Most of the support for the FLN came from outside Algeria. The Arab states of Morocco and Tunisia won their independence from France in 1955 and provided both moral support and material assistance to the insurgents. These countries also allowed the FLN to use their territory as a base and sanctuary from French pursuit. To sever this link and contain the insurgency, an extensive barrier system was built along the Tunisian border in 1957, and later along the Moroccan border in 1958. These elaborate barriers consisted of three belts of minefields and barbed wire with an electrified fence in the center belt. The electric charge of 5000 volts was used to rapidly determine at what point the barrier was being probed rather than to electrocute trespassers, although the possibility of being electrocuted made it a formidable psychological weapon. The barriers were supported by highly mobile forces that could react immediately to any thrust by the guerrillas. Jules Roy, an Algerian writer, describes rebel efforts to cross these barriers.

> Attempts to break through are virtually doomed to failure; and only isolated individuals, who melt easily into the landscape, can hope to have time to blow up the high tension wires and the barbed wire entanglements without being caught, and then to slip through the minefields and escape the concentrated artillery fire and the sealed-off areas.[18]

The Mediterranean was patrolled closely to prevent shipments of arms from abroad from reaching the insurgents. Ships from many nations were stopped and searched; if arms and supplies were aboard

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[17]Paret, p. 65.

[18]Jules Roy, The War in Algeria, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 86.

they were confiscated. A prime example was the boarding of a Yugoslav

ship in May 1958 and the seizure of 150 tons of arms and equipment

destined for the FLN.[19] The sea blockade and the barrier system com-

bination effectively reduced the outside support of the FLN.

To prevent French weapons from eventually being used against

French soldiers and citizens in Algeria, France suspended export of

French arms feeling these weapons would eventually be turned over to

the rebels in many cases.

As in all insurgencies, the identification of rebels became a

serious problem. A system of identity cards was established but was

not very effective.[20] Despite the drawbacks in the identity card

system, the French were able to develop a highly successful system of

population control. Each family head was made responsible for all the

members of his family and reported to a block leader who was an agent

of the government. The block leader reported on the movements of all

inhabitants in his block and notified officials when strangers who were

not bona fide visitors appeared. This system was employed very suc-

cessfully in the Casbah during the "Battle of Algiers" in 1957. The

French Army was able to drastically reduce acts of terrorism and

completely uproot and destroy the rebel underground in the city of

Algiers by integrating movement control, intelligence, and patrolling

into a coordinated operation.

Food control was practiced, but generally the insurgents were

not seriously handicapped by shortages of food. Food rationing was

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[19]New York Times, January 20, 1958, p. 1.

[20]Paret, p. 86.

instituted to insure equitable distribution of food especially in the
relocated villages as well as to deny food to the guerrillas. No shops
were allowed to operate in the rural areas, and most of the food was
handled through government agencies.[21] Still, the guerrillas were able
to obtain their food from the population apparently with little dif-
ficulty.

In addition to the restricted and security zones mentioned
previously, other area designations were established. "Zones Surveil-
lee," or surveillance zones, had the full spectrum of controls in
force. Travel after dark was not allowed, identity cards were required,
and checkpoints were established on all major routes. Military opera-
tions were conducted against guerrilla bands, and many areas had strict
prohibitions on all civilian movement. The rebel bands were reduced to
twenty to thirty men each and could only accomplish occasional acts of
terrorism. "Zones Libre" or cleared areas were established when an
area became free of insurgent activity. In these areas, no curfews
were in force and travel was allowed at night. These zones were
returned to civilian administrative control, and normal economic
activity was reestablished.

By 1958, a military stalemate had been reached.[22] French
pacification efforts were successful to the degree of containing the
insurgency, and the rebels could entertain no ideas of achieving any
semblance of a military victory. With involvement of the French Army
in French politics in the summer of 1958, the necessity of a political

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[21]Roy, p. 61.

[22]Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1963), pp. 39-43.

rather than a military solution became apparent. The stalemate continued for almost four years, and on 1 July 1962, Algeria achieved its independence.

CHAPTER VI

ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL POPULACE
AND RESOURCES
CONTROL

Results of Research

The analysis of the insurgencies in Greece, Algeria, Malaya, and the Philippines revealed that insurgent movements were able to gain considerable popular support and ultimately were able to threaten the existence of the governments through the subversion of portions of the populations. In Greece and Algeria, outside support was furnished to the insurgents; but in Malaya and the Philippines, no significant external support was provided.

The populace and resources control measures implemented made a significant contribution to the success of internal defense operations. However, the research by the author did not reveal the use of any systematic method of periodically evaluating the overall success of the populace and resources control program in any of the insurgency cases. Also, no attempt by the governments concerned to precisely determine the success of individual populace and resources control measures was discovered during the research. Rather, the general method of measuring success was a determination of overall internal defense progress in achieving the final objective of eliminating the insurgency and restoring stability, without evaluating the particular

individual contributions made by populace and resources control, counterguerrilla, and environmental improvement programs.

Legal Authority

While the insurgents were able to incorporate legal and illegal methods in their operations, the governments were restricted to legal means. Action in accordance with the law was an important factor in each of the case studies. In Algeria, where actions were not always in conformance with the law, the long range detrimental effects of a few illegal actions greatly outweighed the short term benefits.

A successful program of populace and resources control not only isolates the insurgent from the population and material resources but also establishes positive government control. The enforcement of this control must be clearly within the limits of legal statutes, and all government actions must conform to the restraints of enacted regulations. Sir Robert Thompson is quite explicit on this point.

> A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for the advantage of being the government.[1]

The first element in a successful population and resources control program is the enactment of promulgation of appropriate regulations necessary to legally cope with the insurgency. In organizing a populace and resources control program, the law and order situation and the requirements for imposition of special restrictions on the population must be considered. After the program objectives have been

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[1]Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 52-53.

established, necessary legislation should be enacted to enable officials to enforce the control measures. However, the enactment of laws that cannot be enforced or which discriminate against a particular segment of the population is undesirable.[2]

The extensive Emergency Regulations enacted in Malaya in 1948 are a prime example of the legalization of controls. Special regulations were passed by the French Assembly for Algeria although the severity of controls was not nearly as great as that in Malaya. In Greece, laws were passed on an individual basis after the need for such legislation became pressing. An example is the imposition of martial law after the assassination of the Justice Minister in Athens in May 1948.

Extensive new regulations were not enacted in the Philippines; however, several presidential orders involving amnesty and illegal weapons were issued. The Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) at the local level were able to conduct the populace and resources control program within the existing laws and did not require enactment of new ones.

A Framework of Security

The primary objectives of populace and resources control are to identify and neutralize the insurgents, their organization, their activities, and influence.[3] Inherent in these objectives are the goals of exercising positive government control over the population and

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[2]Thompson, p. 53.

[3]U.S. Department of the Army, Advisor Handbook for Counter-insurgency, FM 31-73 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1965), p. 28.

obtaining its loyal cooperation. In achieving these objectives, the
first and most difficult problem facing the government is the estab-
lishment of a solid security framework covering the entire population
of the small towns and villages of a given area.[4]

The security framework involves the establishment of physical
security in the existing villages and the concentration of the popu-
lation into these or other villages that may be defended against in-
surgent attacks. Before this could be effected in Algeria, Malaya,
and Greece, a large scale resettlement of most of the rural population
was required in order to isolate the guerrillas and regain government
control over the populace. In the Philippines, Magsaysay used a reset-
tlement plan to separate land-hungry peasant insurgents from the true
Communist insurgents.[5] Resettlement accomplished three things. First,
inhabitants were removed from combat areas which reduced interference
with combat operations against the guerrillas. Second, the insurgents'
major source of supplies, recruits and information was removed and his
support drastically reduced. Third, the government's capability to
protect the rural population was enhanced by the grouping of the rural
populace into villages that could be defended.

Secured Villages

The major method of continuing the isolation of the insurgents
and reinstituting government control was the establishment of defended
and secured villages. Secured villages with locally recruited self-

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[4]Thompson, p. 121.

[5]John S. Pustay, <u>Counterinsurgency Warfare</u> (New York: Free
Press, 1965), p. 101.

defense groups were established in Greece, Malaya, and Algeria. In the Philippines, defended barrios protected by BCTs and the Constabulary were developed. Development of secured villages was probably the most important element of the populace and resources control programs because security, a prerequisite for the success of later development programs, was furnished to the rural population.

Area Security

Extension of the security framework involves a long and arduous process of slowly extending government control over the rural population, the countryside, and lines of communication. In Malaya and Algeria, as the government assumed firm control, areas were declared free of insurgents and restrictive measures were lifted. Designation of these areas became a motivating influence on the rural population because it signaled the end of the conflict in their area. The elimination of the armed guerrilla bands was a military responsibility. Once this was achieved, the populace and resources control program established security and prevented the reinfiltration of insurgents.

The Greek Army used a system of staggered expansion of control to establish secure areas. Military forces drove out the guerrillas; police arrested and deported all known and suspected insurgents; and paramilitary forces guarded key installations and provided security for the rural villages. Area control was not emphasized in the Philippines, as the BCTs occupied the barrios and conducted counterguerrilla operations into the mountainous areas utilized by the Huks.

Lines of Communications Security

During an active insurgency, lines of communications become

extremely vulnerable to insurgent interdiction. Open lines of communications are necessary for an adequate military logistics system and the success of economic development projects. The government must secure and defend the lines of communications, if the security framework established in the rural areas is to be permanent. This is usually a joint effort of law enforcement agencies, military, and paramilitary forces.

Interdiction of roads was a much used insurgent tactic in the Greek, Algerian, Malayan, and Philippine cases. In Greece, the insurgents derailed almost a hundred trains and carried out over 1600 acts of sabotage against major lines of communications. Similar operations of this type were noted in Algeria and Malaya. The insurgents obtained supplies and funds by collecting taxes and confiscating goods from civilian traffic and were able to isolate large areas of the country by controlling the lines of communications. Government officials were barred from these areas because the roads were not safe for travel. Military forces attempting to use the roads were subjected to ambushes and defeat in detail and were able to resupply their forces in remote areas only with great difficulty. Only by securing the lines of communications and keeping them open were the governments able to conduct effective internal defense operations.

Development of secure villages and control of area and lines of communications are major factors in establishing security in the countryside. These elements contribute materially to the achievement of the internal defense goals and form a vital part of a successful populace and resources control program.

Local Administration

Administration at the local level is the keystone to improved government control in the rural areas. Local officials are the major point of contact between the government and the population and exert great influence in establishing positive government control. A good example of regaining the support and cooperation of the people by efficient local administration is the actions of the <u>Section Adminis-trative Spéciale</u> during the Algerian Rebellion.

French civil affairs officers, trained in Moslem affairs and proficient in the Arabic language, supervised the establishment of village administrations throughout Algeria. Village administrations placed in effect and supervised the enforcement of many of the popu-lace and resources control measures required to defeat the insurgency. Since they were the local representatives of the government and were responsible for implementing government policy, local administration played a vital role in the success of the populace and resources con-trol program.

Forces

Any successful populace and resources control program requires manpower or forces to enforce the control measures and maintain an environment of law and order in the populated areas. The types and numbers of forces required depend on each individual insurgency sit-uation and the specific functions assigned to the law and order agencies. Several types of forces may be organized. Regular police responsible for routine law and order enforcement will be required in

all cases. A special intelligence branch may be activated as was done
in Malaya, if underground activity becomes a serious threat to the
government. Combat Police, similar to the Police Field Forces which
established law and order in the Malayan jungles and prevented the
jungle tribesman from supporting the insurgents, may be required in
countries with large jungle areas. Other special types such as Border
Police and Customs Police may be required in some insurgency situations.

According to Rostow, the first step in an insurgency is not an
argument on the merits of insurgent doctrine, but an attempt by insur-
gents to persuade the peasants that their lives are insecure unless
they cooperate.[6] This persuasion usually consists of eliminating the
law and order forces to demonstrate that the government is incapable
of providing protection to the population. The removal of government
influence then allows the guerrillas to operate unmolested and free to
inculcate insurgent doctrine and objectives in the peasants.

The cases of Greece, Philippines, and Malaya illustrate the
primacy of eliminating the rural policeman as a major step in enhancing
the insurgency. In Algeria, guerrilla action to eliminate the caids or
native chiefs was instituted early in the insurgency. Conducting the
routine activities of everyday life without interference or intimi-
dation by guerrillas became increasingly difficult for the population
as the insurgency progressed. Elimination of the police was a twofold
loss to the government because law and order broke down, and the gov-
ernment lost an effective representative in the rural areas. Since an

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[6]W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Undeveloped Areas,"
The Guerrilla—and How to Fight Him, T. N. Greene ed. (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 61.

effective police organization is necessary in internal defense situations, the government had to take action to ensure that the police forces in the rural areas were not destroyed and that police effectiveness was improved as the insurgency developed.

Cordon and Search

In establishing security and regaining control over the population and resources, several types of operations were conducted. Cordon and search was an operational technique used in Greece, Algeria, the Philippines, and Malaya but was more effective in the latter two cases where the insurgents operated in very small groups. These operations were used effectively by the British in the later stages of the Malaya insurgency in improving the effectiveness of the food denial program. BCTs conducted numerous cordon and search operations in gaining control of the <u>barrios</u> in the Philippines.

The large number of personnel required to conduct these operations dictate that they be an integrated effort by police, military, and paramilitary forces. These operations prevent the insurgents from stationing cadres and establishing supply caches in villages subject to cordon and search. Equally important, they offer a good reason for the loyal peasant to refuse to hide personnel or store supplies for the insurgents since the government might discover any hidden supplies or people if an operation is conducted.

Population Screening

A key factor in separating the insurgents from the population and then maintaining this separation is some method of screening and

documenting the populace. In internal defense, such a program performs several basic functions. It precisely establishes the names and specific residences of the inhabitants of a particular hamlet, village, or city and provides a record of all these persons for government authorities. Once a record of who should be in a specific place is established, routine police checks will detect strangers and the absence of authorized residents.

Such a system was used effectively in Malaya and in parts of Algeria to reduce the freedom of movement of insurgents. A similar method was used by the BCTs on a local level in the Philippines. Insurgents could not be prevented from obtaining identity documents, but periodic checks and requirements to show identification at checkpoints and in restricted areas forced the guerrillas to greatly reduce their movements and subjected them to government scrutiny.

Movement Control

To reduce possible contact between the population and the insurgents, the administration must institute a system of movement control. An objective of movement control is the reduction of contact between the populace and insurgent forces which may be operating in nearby uninhabited areas. The numbers of people who become prey to guerrilla checkpoints, taxation, kidnappings, and propaganda are also decreased through movement control. Movement control includes such measures as curfew and blackout, restricted areas, special passes, and checkpoints.

Movement controls were exercised to a marked degree in Greece, Malaya, Algeria, and the Philippines, and were important factors in

reducing insurgent activity. In Malaya, close patrolling of villages, detailed searches, and numerous checks reduced the contact between the guerrillas and their supporters and virtually eliminated the villages as a source of supply. Movement control also had an intelligence value, for by tracing the movements of certain individuals, entire insurgent organizations were uncovered as was done by Magsaysay in capturing the "Politburo-in" in Manila shortly after he became Secretary of Defense.

Curfews and blackouts were effective measures employed in Greece, Malaya, Algeria, and to a lesser degree in the Philippines to reduce insurgent movement at night especially in the cities. The curfew permitted the government forces to take drastic action against the violators and was effective in reducing the number of terrorist acts. The curfews also assisted in disrupting the insurgents' communications with the rural villages, for the insurgents were forced to make their contacts during the day when there was a higher risk of being observed by government agents.

After the means are established to separate insurgents from the population, the government must take action to consolidate control and prevent reentry of the insurgents. This was accomplished in Greece, Malaya, Algeria, and the Philippines by the use of forces to patrol between villages; the establishment of road blocks; and the restriction of access to key installations such as police stations, government buildings, and communications installations.

Infrastructure Elimination

At the same time security measures are being employed to deny

access to the insurgents, internal security operations must be expanded to locate and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure. The Aftoamyna was destroyed in Greece by mass arrests, detentions, and deportations. In Malaya, the Min Yuen was neutralized by effective police action and strict movement control. In the Philippines, Magsaysay used informants, infiltrators, and a system of rewards to eliminate the Huk hierarchy and the Politburos. In Algeria, the underground was not destroyed but was neutralized by police action, stringent population control, and repressive action by French military forces. Elimination or neutralization of the infrastructure was required; otherwise the insurgents could have continued to develop their organizations and conduct their subversive activities.

Resources Control

The purpose of resources control is to prevent materials of value from falling into insurgent hands. It includes such measures as strict rationing, crop destruction, designation of restricted items, control of weapons and munitions, and limits on the amounts of food and other items that a person may possess.

A most comprehensive resources control program was put in effect in Malaya as part of the Briggs Plan. Resources control measures played a major role in the reduction in the size of the guerrilla bands, for the insurgents became unable to obtain sufficient supplies to support large units. Resources control was decentralized in the Philippines with the exception of the nationwide program for collection of illegal weapons. Limits on the amounts of food a person could purchase or possess, surveillance over shops selling printing equipment,

and a system of checkpoints were some of the other measures that contributed to the defeat of the Huks. Resources control in Algeria included the closing of all food shops and distributing food through government channels. Resources control in Greece was aggravated by the open borders and by the lack of effective enforcement of the authorized control measures.

The location and destruction of food crops and livestock in insurgent base areas were significant contributions to the food denial program. Crops grown by guerrillas were successfully destroyed in Malaya using chemicals. In the Philippines, combat operations were conducted to prevent the insurgents from harvesting the crops in their production bases.

Control of weapons and ammunition in an insurgency is always a critical problem. The sources of weapons must be strictly controlled; and all efforts made to collect weapons left over from previous conflicts, in order to prevent such weapons from being used by insurgents.

During the Emergency in Malaya, the death penalty was prescribed for possession of an illegal weapon. Magsaysay conducted several campaigns to reduce the number of illegal weapons in the hands of the population of the Philippines by paying rewards for surrendered weapons.

Resources control measures must be closely coordinated with other aspects of the populace and resources control program since populace, movement, and resources control are all closely interrelated and share common functions. Intelligence must be utilized to the maximum to gain information on shortages of specific supplies and equipment existing in the guerrilla organization so additional emphasis

may be placed on control of these items. Psychological operations must be employed to publicize the controls to the insurgents and make the controls more acceptable to the local populace.

CHAPTER VII

A MEASUREMENT SYSTEM FOR POPULACE
AND RESOURCES
CONTROL

In the preceding chapter, essential elements of a successful populace and resources control program were discussed. As the elements are implemented in an insurgency situation, indicators of success will appear. An indicator of success is a manifestation or evidence that the populace and resources control program is achieving its primary objectives. The best indicator of success is the elimination of the insurgency and the attainment of stability; but until complete stability is achieved, the population and resources control program must be evaluated for success in achieving its objectives using less obvious indicators.

After the populace and resources control program has been determined, a measuring system for success can be developed. Such a system will consist of two processes. The first is gathering the requisite items of data, and the second is processing the data into meaningful information that will indicate success, trends, and problem areas. An optimum system will evaluate every aspect of the populace and resources control program as accurately as possible. Before a system can be used, however, the elements to be measured must be selected and indicators and parameters defined so that necessary data to support the system may be collected. The elements selected for measurement are those listed in Chapter VI.

intimidation, and internal development projects can be initiated.

b. The village is capable of defending itself against the most probably guerrilla threat (usually a squad or a platoon).

c. A communications system is in operation allowing quick response by government forces if the village comes under attack.

d. The insurgent underground in the village has been identified and neutralized or destroyed.

2. <u>Developing villages</u>. These are villages in which the government is attempting to gain complete control, but the village does not meet all the established criteria for a secured village. Action is being taken to meet the required standards.

3. <u>Contested villages</u>. These are villages in which there is a definite struggle for control between insurgents and government forces.

4. <u>Insurgent villages</u>. These are villages in which the guerrillas have expelled government representatives and have installed an insurgent administration.

A significant item of data is the number of total villages that have been secured. This will give a broad indication of the success level of the secured village program. The number of villages that fall into the developing category is indicative of the magnitude of the developing effort. The number of villages that fall in the contested category will show the dimensions of the low level struggle between the insurgents and local government forces. The number of villages under insurgent control indicates the extent to which the insurgents have been able to impose their will on the countryside.

Two important indicators in the development of secured villages

are the number of villages that have a trained and equipped self-defense force and the number that have a system of rapid communications with higher or adjacent headquarters to request assistance in case of attack. Villages that have been secured have these forces and communications; however, the items are included in the measurement system to provide an indication of total number of villages, both secured and unsecured, that have adequate self-defense forces and communications.

Area Control

The control of the territory within a country combating insurgency will generally fall into the same basic security categories as the villages and the population. Insurgent control is a nebulous term when area is considered, for guerrillas usually do not attempt to hold terrain except in unusual circumstances. The degree to which the insurgents can exert their administrative control is the governing factor rather than the guerrilla capability to deny access to government forces. Government military forces can usually operate in any area, provided sufficient troops are massed. The deciding factor, however, is who retains control after the military formations are withdrawn.

In this study four categories of area control will be considered.

1. <u>Secured.</u> This area is under government control day and night. Insurgent activity is limited to isolated terrorist attacks and occasional distribution of insurgent propaganda.

2. <u>Contested.</u> This area is not under the firm control of either side. Both government forces and insurgent forces are attempting to gain control of the area.

3. Insurgent. This area is under insurgent administrative control or is used by guerrillas as a military base area. Large government military formations are required in order to conduct operations into the area.

4. Nonstrategic. This area is of no interest to either side. It includes uninhabitable marshlands, deserts, mountains, and jungle areas that are not used by either side.

Lines of Communications Security

The government must conduct a continual evaluation of the security status of lines of communications so action may be taken to prevent insurgents from interdicting roads, railways, and waterways in their efforts to isolate rural areas. Open lines of communications are required for movement of military personnel and equipment and are a necessary adjunct to economic functioning and development.

In an insurgency, lines of communications will generally fall into one of the three following categories of security status which will be used in the proposed measurement system.

1. Secured. These thoroughfares may be used without employing security measures and are under government control day and night.

2. Marginal. These may be used employing security measures. Unescorted traffic is subject to insurgent harassment and taxation.

3. Closed. These may be physically closed due to destruction of bridges, erection of barriers, or the area through which the thoroughfare passes may be under firm insurgent control. Major military operations and repairs are required to open it for use.

Population Data

Population data used in conjunction with secure village data, area control, and lines of communications security status will furnish a good estimate of the degree of government control in the rural areas. [Based on experience in Vietnam, the author feels strongly that only the rural population should be considered; as insurgency is primarily a struggle for control of the rural population. When urban populace is included in the population statistics, the data becomes heavily weighted in the government's favor and tends to make the insurgent controlled population appear less significant. A more meaningful comparison is government controlled rural population versus insurgent controlled population.]

The population categories will generally be the same as the secured village categories since the majority of the people will live in villages. Two additional categories may be required to insure that all the rural population is included. A category is necessary to denote rural population that is residing in refugee camps, relocation, and resettlement centers. Another category is required for people who do not live in organized villages. Nomadic tribes and aborigines would be included in the latter category. Compilation of this data will then denote the security status of the complete rural populace.

Public Administration

Administration at the local level is the keystone to improved government control in the rural areas. Monitoring and supervising local administrations are usually responsibilities of a ministry in the central government. However, because of the relative importance

of local administration in gaining and maintaining government control,
the status of local administrations is of interest at all higher eche-
lons. The items to be evaluated are the numbers of villages which
have a legitimate local administration and the number of local offi-
cials killed, kidnapped, or intimidated by insurgents. The latter
will show the intensity and magnitude of the insurgents' efforts to
destroy the government's local administrations.

A good measure of the effectiveness of public administration
and internal security is the willingness with which the population
voluntarily gives information about the insurgents. This item also
indicates to what degree the insurgents have lost their ideological
appeal. The data necessary to evaluate this element is the number of
confirmed items of information that have been given by the population
voluntarily.

Populace and Resources Control Forces

The effectiveness of the populace and resources control forces
is of major interest at all levels of internal defense. In determining
effectiveness, the first aspect to be evaluated is the number of police-
men on the job compared to the number required. The number of police-
men required must be determined considering such factors as the degree
of lawlessness, the level of the insurgency, and the nature and dis-
tribution of the populace in light of the local situation.

If all vacancies are filled, the adequacy of the authorized
forces should become apparent after a few months of operation in an
insurgency environment. If there are vacancies in the police forces,
then the distribution of the vacancies, both position and area wise,

should be examined for a pattern or indication of possible deficiencies in a particular area of the country or a particular branch of the police forces. The degree or amount of training by type is also of considerable interest. The fact that a country has a large police force does not necessarily guarantee that it is an effective one. One of the indicators of effectiveness is the amount of training that the police force has received especially policemen at the village level. Training of the special branches and combat police should also be considered in determining their effectiveness.

The next item to be checked is the turnover in forces. If policemen are being intimidated, forced to resign, or killed, this fact will be reflected in the turnover rate and will highlight the problem. The turnover in forces by type will furnish some indication of insurgent campaigns against the law enforcement agencies and show whether the effort is directed against a particular branch of the police forces.

Population Screening and Documentation

One of the police functions that lends itself readily to measurement is the screening and documentation of the population. The purpose of evaluating this activity is to determine the extent to which documentation and screening of the population has been accomplished, delineate particular problem areas, and determine the general acceptance of the system. The advantages of a screening system cannot be realized until the entire population has been completely documented; therefore, the first item of interest is how much of the population has been issued identity documents.

The number of duplicate cards issued will reflect insurgent efforts to disrupt the documentation system and the motivation of the people to safeguard their cards. Each lost card case must be investigated to determine if the loss was caused by insurgents or carelessness. Strong penalties for negligent loss of cards should reduce the number due to personal negligence. The two types of losses should be included in the data requirements.

Routine checks to see if people are carrying their documents will show the general acceptance of the requirement to carry identity documents.

The information necessary to establish the degree of acceptance is the percentage of the people which did not have identity documents in their possession during checks.

Checkpoints

A basic element of populace and resources control enforcement is the checkpoint at which identity documents, vehicles, and cargo are examined by government authorities. Besides reducing the physical flow of materials to the insurgents, the checkpoints act as psychological barriers to the movement of personnel and goods to the guerrillas. People who aren't avid insurgent supporters will not risk transporting materials to the insurgents for fear of being caught. The checkpoints then are valuable for the amount of insurgent goods intercepted, and possibly just as important, the amount of material that is never sent because of the risks involved. The latter amounts cannot be determined.

Of interest is the types and numbers of checkpoints in operation and the numbers of personnel and vehicles checked. The

effectiveness of the checkpoints will be indicated by the degree of success in movement control and resources control.

Cordon and Search

The items to be evaluated are the availability of forces, and the number of cordon and search operations conducted. However, the total value of these operations should not be judged wholly from the numbers conducted and amounts of materials and numbers of persons captured. The deterrent effect that these operations have on the population must also be considered in the ultimate appraisal.

Since cordon and search operations require large numbers of forces not usually under the control of the law enforcement officials, the availability of the forces for these operations is of interest at higher levels. If forces are not being made available, action consistent with priorities of employment can be taken at higher agencies to make forces available.

Reports on the number of operations conducted indicate to the authorities the extent to which local officials are conducting these operations. Materials and personnel captured will be noted in other parts of the measurement system.

Movement Control

Movement controls are designed to reduce the freedom of movement of the insurgents and to reduce contact between the population and the insurgents. The absolute effectiveness of movement control is difficult to establish since only the insurgents know the true success of movement control. However, a tabulation of movement control

statistics will furnish an indication of the trends and is useful in making comparisons of different reporting periods.

The numbers of persons apprehended are useful when compared to performance during the previous period. This data is also useful in comparing movement control performance of different regions.

When evacuation of designated zones is required, the number and average size of such restricted zones are of interest at the regional and national level. Reporting data on this aspect of movement control will indicate the extent to which restricted zones are being employed. The number and size of these zones will corroborate security conditions in the area where they are imposed. As the government regains control, the number of such areas should show a downward trend. By having this data available, the government will be able to verify that the restrictions are lifted and normal access to the area is restored when the areas are secured by government forces.

Elimination of Infrastructure

A major goal of the populace and resources control program is the detection and elimination of the insurgent infrastructure. Measuring accomplishment of this objective generates two benefits. First, it directs attention to this vital aspect of defeating the insurgency, causing the police to continually exert efforts to uproot the underground. Second, it gives some indication of the remaining potential of the insurgent underground. The first task is to determine the organizational structure of the insurgent movement. In Communist inspired subversive insurgency, the organizations are generally stereotyped and operate with only small variations. The best source of

this information is captured insurgent documents and interrogation reports from prisoners or surrendered guerrillas. Once the tables of organization are established, the next step is to identify the members by name and address if possible. The second task becomes that of locating and neutralizing the listed persons. For measurement purposes, the items of interest are: (1) the extent to which the infrastructure has been identified by personality, and (2) the amount of the infrastructure that has been eliminated or destroyed. This data must be judiciously interpreted. Failure to identify a personality in a particular position of the organization could mean one of two things. The position could be vacant, or the person filling it just has not been identified by government forces. Consideration must also be given to the rapidity in which the insurgent organization replaces its losses. A particular section or element may be destroyed several times in a short period and yet be able to recruit replacements and continue to operate without interruption.

Resources Control

The measurement of the effectiveness of a resources control program must be based primarily on intelligence and the compilation of statistical data on resources control activities. Intelligence collection must be directed towards gathering information on shortages within the insurgent forces and the amount of restrictions on insurgent operations caused by resources control. Statistical data will not give an absolute measurement but will be useful in making comparisons with previous reporting periods to indicate changes. When correlated with movement control data, a broad trend may be established.

If restrictions are placed on the ownership or possession of items such as motor vehicles, cameras, weapons, communications equipment, and printing equipment; measurement of the success of these restrictions is appropriate. The amounts of these items captured and lost is necessary to establish a ratio between government confiscations and government losses for these items.

Crop Destruction

The effectiveness of the destruction of insurgent food crops can be determined to a precise degree. Accurate surveys utilizing aerial photography will provide the exact locations, acreage, and types of crops. After destruction missions are completed, a new survey will show the degree of effectiveness of the destruction measures. The items of data of interest are the total acreage of food crops in insurgent areas and the total acreage that has been destroyed.

Incident Reporting

The degree to which the government is accomplishing its populace and resources control program will be reflected by the level of guerrilla activity in the particular area under consideration. A reliable index of the level of insurgent activity can be obtained by the use of an incident reporting system.

Responsibility for incident reporting rests primarily with the police, for in most cases, they are usually the first government agency made aware of the incident.[1] To be effective and valid, the types and

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[1] E. H. Adkins Jr., The Police and Resources Control in Counterinsurgency (Saigon: U.S. Operations Mission to Vietnam, 1964), pp. 31-35.

classification of incidents and the reporting channels must be under-
stood at all levels. Checks must be made to insure that all incidents
are reported and the system fully utilized. Law enforcement agencies
must be convinced that the level of incidents does not reflect on
their individual effectiveness and should be encouraged to report all
incidents. The degree of government control of the area must also be
taken into consideration. The fact that a particular area reports few
or no incidents may be misleading, as few or no incidents would be
expected from areas under firm government control or from areas under
complete insurgent control.[2]

The possibility exists that many incidents reported as insur-
gency-connected may be actually crimes committed for personal rather
than political reasons. It is also reasonable to conclude that with
the breakdown in law and order the frequency of ordinary crimes will
increase. Each specific incident must be investigated and a determi-
nation made as to the nature of the incident and whether it should be
reported as a crime or an insurgent incident.

For reporting purposes, an explicit definition and delineation
of what constitutes an incident is required. Officially, an incident
is a brief clash or other military disturbance generally of a transi-
tory nature and not involving protracted hostilities.[3] By expanding
this definition to include civil disturbances not of a protracted

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[2]Sir Robert Thompson, _Defeating Communist Insurgency_ (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 52-53.

[3]U.S. Department of the Army, _Dictionary of United States
Army Terms_, AR 320-5 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
April 1965), pp. 214-15.

duration, the meaning is adequate for use in this study.

Incidents should be classified according to the seriousness in order to give an indication of the level of intensity of insurgent activity. The classifications and definitions of incidents will be determined according to local requirements in an insurgency situation. Experience and the amount of detailed information required in reports will dictate the number of categories. For purposes of this study, three categories will be selected.

1. A serious incident is one in which loss of life occurred. The person killed may be a civilian, government official, or an insurgent.

2. A major incident is one in which serious injury, or major loss or destruction of property occurs.

3. A minor incident is a disturbance in which minor injuries or minor loss of property occurs.

Incidents reports are a good indicator of what is happening throughout the country. The numbers and types of incidents are useful at the national level to determine where the insurgents' main efforts are centered and to determine changes in the levels of insurgent activity.

The requirements for additional regulations are included in the measurement system, so that these requirements may be reviewed in light of the overall populace and resources control situation. The information required is a short description of the authority or regulation required that is not presently in effect.

Processing and Interpretation of Data

The information generated must be processed and presented in a

form that is useable by senior officials. [The reader should now refer to Appendix II which is the proposed form illustrating the processed information.] Status data is useful in depicting the current situation, but few trends or changes will be evident in raw data alone. However, if the data for several reporting periods is compared, changes and rates of change may be determined and projections made if required. Trends and changes indicate the amount of progress; and when utilized in conjunction with data from the counterguerrilla and environmental improvement programs, are useful to authorities in considering courses of action and pointing out where additional emphasis is needed.

In actual situations, the processing of the data is tailored to the requirements of the authorities using the processed information. The measurement of all the selected elements should be made because a close correlation exists among many of the elements and progress in one should be accompanied by corresponding changes in others. Secured village data should be compared with reports for previous periods to determine both the short and long term gains. Since the construction of secured villages is a lengthy undertaking, changes over a six-month period would probably be more significant than changes during a single month. Percentages are a useful tool; they indicate both status and the degree to which the final objective of secured status for 100 percent of the villages is being achieved. These changes will indicate the upward or downward trend that the secured village program exhibits. How much remains to be accomplished and how much time is required to accomplish the program at the present rate can be easily computed. By knowing the progress rate, the impact of other variables such as an increase in external support for the insurgents or an increase in

paramilitary strengths may be predicted.

Villages should evolve up from insurgent to contested, developing, and finally to secured, in sequence. In a successful program, the insurgent percentage would be expected to diminish as the secured increases if a steady rate of progress is maintained. The contested and developing categories would be expected to remain fairly constant depending on the availability of forces to clear and hold and cadres and material to assist the developing villages.

Village self-defense and communications capabilities should be processed similarly to show the percentages that have the capabilities and the changes from previous periods. This information will indicate the total number of villages with self-defense forces and two-way communications and is useful in determining the number of potential secured villages.

Similarly, population, area, and lines of communications information should be converted to percentage data and compared with previous evaluations to determine the degree of success. The population, area control, and lines of communications security data should be considered in conjunction with the secure village data, since these aspects are closely interrelated. A strong correlation should exist among the four elements: secured villages, population, area, and lines of communications. For example, significant increases in secured villages and population and little or no increases in the amount of secured area and secured lines of communications would indicate that clear and hold operations were not keeping pace with secured village development. Secured area and lines of communications should expand

around the secured villages and should show increases as additional villages are secured.

The changes in village administration data should be computed to determine if a favorable trend is being established. This information also should correlate directly with the development of secure villages and inversely with infrastructure destruction. The number of officials lost due to insurgent action should decrease as security improves. The amount of voluntary intelligence is significant in the raw form, but increases or decreases in the number of items of intelligence given voluntarily should be computed to show the amount of improvement. The increase in number of items is sufficient to show developing trends. Computation of a percentage increase could possibly distort the trends if the total number of items is low.

Compilation of the control forces data is straightforward. Computed changes in strengths, losses, and the training of forces are important in evaluating the effectiveness of these forces, particularly the village police. Major deficiencies such as low strengths and increasing loss rates will indicate that a problem exists in the population and resources control forces and may impact on other internal defense operations. Improvements in the police force status should correlate directly with positive improvements in secure villages, resources control, voluntary intelligence, and infrastructure elimination.

The population screening and documentation data should be compared with data from the previous reports to show the degree of change. Trends in the issue of duplicate cards and the changes in percentages of persons checked who do not have identity cards in their possession

should be noted. Upward trends in this information may indicate the need for a psychological operations campaign with the objective of improving the safeguarding and acceptance of identity documents. Large increases in the number of insurgent caused duplicate card issues should be investigated to determine if a concerted insurgent effort is being directed at the documentation program.

Checkpoint data is evaluated to determine the increase or decrease in numbers of checkpoints in operation and increases or decreases in performance. Correlation with apprehension data and amounts of materials confiscated may furnish an indication of effectiveness of checkpoints. If the number of checkpoints is increased, increases in apprehensions and materials seized should also increase, provided the additional checkpoints are employed effectively.

Increases or decreases in the number of cordon and search operations should be correlated with the results of resources control and infrastructure elimination. A direct correlation should be established, i.e., an increase in cordon and search operations should be reflected in increased infrastructure eliminated and more illegal material seized.

Changes in movement control data should display a close correlation with the other elements in the measurement system. Generally, the movement control statistics should show a slowly downward trend as secured villages and population, voluntary intelligence, infrastructure elimination, and police forces improve. A sharp increase is to be expected initially as the movement control measures are put into effect. As the situation improves, the results then should trend downward.

The elimination of insurgent infrastructure data will probably

be the least precise of all the information collected and should be used with caution. Changes in the percentages from previous reports should be computed; however, these changes will only give a broad indication of accomplishments in this field during the reporting period since many of the people eliminated may have been replaced. The current status at the end of the reporting period should be examined concurrently with secured village and population, voluntary intelligence, resources control, and incident rates. As the percentage of the infrastructure destroyed rises, improvements in the other areas should also be noted. Conversely, if the percentage destroyed is low, difficulties can be expected in secured village programs and resources control. Voluntary intelligence will probably remain at a low level.

For resources control data, a comparison should be made between the quantities of material confiscated from and that seized by insurgents. The objective of this comparison is to determine if the insurgents' supply stocks from local sources are increasing or decreasing. This comparison is essential for weapons, as an increase in insurgent weapons will ultimately result in increased armed guerrilla capabilities. If insurgents are supported externally, such a ratio takes on less significance but should not be discounted. The amounts of materials seized from the insurgents or destroyed would then be a more meaningful indicator in external support cases.

Raw data on destruction of insurgent crops is sufficient, although changes may be easily computed. When considered in conjunction with data such as amount of destruction of insurgent depots, factories, and facilities from counterguerrilla and economic warfare

programs, the destruction data is useful in evaluating insurgent economic potential. Predicting the volume and flow of refugees from insurgent areas is more accurate when crop destruction data is considered.

Long and short term trends in incidents should be developed. As mentioned previously, incident data should be used only as an integral part of the overall measurement program. The importance of incident reporting lies in the fact that incident reports are usually the first indications of expanded or reduced insurgent activity. The long term changes in the number of incidents should be tabulated for regional or national levels only, so broad trends in the levels of insurgent activity may be deduced. Short term trends may indicate areas of future insurgent activity if the increase is sharp.

The regulations and legislation requirements data is not processed statistically; however, several requirements from different regions for the same type authority may indicate a nationwide need for the particular regulation indicated.

The measurement system presents an overall estimate of the current situation in the populace and resources control program. By making comparisons between reports for successive periods, changes in the situation, and changes in performance may be determined. These trends are useful in evaluating the success or failure of the program and should be considered in planning future courses of action. In the latter case, however, information from other internal defense operations is essential so all the factors affecting the situation are considered.

CHAPTER VIII

SYSTEM FEASIBILITY

Factors which should be considered in determining the feasibility of measuring progress in populace and resources control are the composition and magnitude of the populace and resources control program, availability of qualified personnel at all levels to perform collection and processing of data, and the availability and reliability of the input information. The major portion of the data required will be available and reported through military or various agency channels in the government to satisfy agency reporting requirements. The major tasks in placing the system in operation will be the assembly of all the data and the establishment of uniform processing procedures. In underdeveloped countries, the use of qualified advisory personnel may be required initially to train local officials in uniform collecting and processing procedures and assist in the evaluation of processed information.

The composition and magnitude of the populace and resources control program is dictated by the level of intensity and extent of the insurgency. Countries countering latent and incipient subversive insurgency will require implementation of an extensive populace and resources control program in order to prevent the insurgency from gaining strength and evolving into organized guerrilla warfare. In this early phase, emphasis is placed on population control, movement

and resources control, and elimination of the insurgent infrastructure. In organized guerrilla warfare and war of movement phases, populace and resources control emphasis is placed on establishing physical security in the countryside.

Feedback on the success of the program put into effect is essential, especially in the latent or incipient and guerrilla warfare phases of insurgency when the populace and resources control program could be the decisive factor in destroying the insurgency. Extensive evaluation of each element of the populace and resources control program will determine the effectiveness of that particular element and will point out needs for additional controls or changes in those put into effect.

In insurgencies where outside support is furnished, resources control measurement data must be interpreted in light of the external support. A large increase in insurgent weapons captured or turned in may signal replacement of old type weapons with newer models from the external sources rather than more effective resources control. Furthermore, the objectives of a food denial program may never be realized if the insurgents have access to outside food supplies. In external support cases, a populace and resources control program is necessary to force the insurgent to rely more and more on his outside sources for food, weapons, and other supplies. As the guerrilla relies increasingly on his external support, he is discredited psychologically and politically to the local residents; for his cause then becomes an externally supported aggression rather than oppressed peasants fighting for their liberty. Measurement of success in populace and resources

control where the insurgents are externally supported is just as valid as in nonsupported insurgencies. However, trends and rates of change in some elements such as resources control would not be as reliable as in nonsupported cases.

A continuing problem in every country plagued by insurgency is the availability of competent administrative personnel, especially at district and village levels where a preponderance of the measurement information must be collected. The government officials at these levels must make the necessary evaluations of secured village develop- ment, population, area, and lines of communications security, and col- lect and maintain the detailed information on elimination of the infra- structure, movement control, and resources control. Performance of these functions requires a reasonable level of administrative compe- tence.

However, the measurement system does not wholly generate the requirement for administrative skills at districts and villages; the routine functioning of the police force and government offices requires an effective level of administrative skills. Imposition of the meas- urement system may impose an additional administrative workload on the local officials, but the skill level required will not exceed that necessary for routine operations of the government agencies.

The proposed measurement system requires a large amount of data that can be obtained only at the village level. To be of maximum value, this data must be compiled and collated for each district, prov- ince, region, and for the entire country. Complete and accurate data is the initial essential requirement of the system. Processing rear- ranges the data and makes comparisons, and evaluation and interpretation

of the processed data develops useful information for decision makers.
If errors are included in the original data, errors will exist in the
final product.

The measurement system is designed to process quantitative
information and can make little use of subjective assessments such as
"unknown" or "undetermined." The best information available is neces-
sary, even if rough estimates must be used until valid data can be
obtained.

Population data must be precise and complete. The population
of each village, district, and province in the country, including those
under insurgent control, must be determined and reported to support the
evaluation of population control, screening, and documentation. In
those villages or areas where the population cannot be determined ac-
curately, an estimate will be required.

A complete census may be necessary as soon as government forces
occupy insurgent areas because of large disturbances in the settlement
patterns caused by guerrilla and counterguerrilla activity. Until ac-
curate data can be reestablished, an estimate of the population is
probably the best data that is available.

Detailed records of police activities such as checkpoint oper-
ations, identity checks, apprehension of suspects, and receipt of intel-
ligence are required to support resources and movement control meas-
urement. Such records are maintained by the police for internal use;
however, all the data required to support the measurement system may
not be readily available or in the proper format. The data will have
to be extracted from police records, and this could prove to be a long

and laborious task with the increased possibility of errors and omissions. A more desirable method would be to revise internal police records procedures so that the measurement data is recorded separately and is readily available.

Detailed information on the insurgent infrastructure must be obtained and maintained at the local level to report the degree to which the underground has been eliminated. Information on village insurgent organizations may be much easier to obtain than information on insurgent intermediate echelons, particularly if insurgent administrative organizations do not conform to the political boundaries in effect. For example, if an insurgent district encompassed portions of three or four government districts, responsibility for detecting and eliminating the insurgent district organization would be divided among the government district chiefs. To solve this problem, assistance must be furnished by higher government levels in maintaining order of battle information and designating responsibility for elimination of specific cells and organizations.

The system requires a determination of the security status of every village, hectare of territory, and kilometer of major roads, railroads, and waterways. Criteria must be established and detailed instructions furnished to local officials so uniform application of the criteria will be accomplished throughout the country. An inspection team at regional or national level may be necessary to check local application of the criteria in order to ensure that the highest degree of standardization possible is being achieved.

Results of populace and resources control activities conducted

by military and paramilitary forces must be recorded and reported to ensure that all populace and resources control actions are included for evaluation. Accurate data on the number and types of incidents must be confirmed and recorded.

Probably the best collecting or control agency for all this data will be the Area Coordination Center (ACC), a combined civil-military headquarters and operations center which plans, coordinates, and directs internal defense operations. Since the ACC is the focal point of internal defense operations, it is the logical point from which to direct the data collection effort.

The measurement system evaluates the current situation; and by comparing data from two different reporting periods, change or progress is computed. The data base consists of fundamental statistical data such as the total population, area, and lengths of lines of communications in each village, district, province, and region of the country. Improvement or regression is determined by the period to period changes. A stable data base is necessary so that all computed changes are, in fact, improvement or regression in the situation and not merely administrative corrections or refinements of previous reports.

This is very applicable when accurate and detailed base information is not available. For example, suppose the insurgent population of a district was reported to be 10,000, and in the succeeding report the estimate was revised to 8,000 based on reports from refugees. No appreciable change in the tactical situation had taken place. When this data is included in the measurement system, a false decrease of 2,000 is injected into the insurgent population category indicating

progress in population control unless the decrease is properly noted as a change in base data. Changes such as increases in total population, tabulation of new census data, and corrections of errors are unavoidable and should be entered into the system as soon as possible to improve the accuracy of the base data. However, such changes should be identified as data base changes and must not be included in the computation of progress. Correlation of all results of the related elements will assist in detecting data base changes, for progress in one element should be accompanied by corresponding progress in others.

The method and system of measuring success in counterguerrilla and environmental improvement programs should be considered to prevent duplication of information. Government executives are interested primarily in the overall success of the entire internal defense effort rather than one particular program. A measurement program utilizing the proposed system in conjunction with similar measurement tools in counterguerrilla and environmental improvement would provide valid data, not only on the respective programs, but also on the overall internal defense progress as well.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Successful populace and resources control programs were vital ingredients in the internal defense of Greece, Malaya, Algeria, and the Philippines. In each of these countries, the insurgents were successful until integrated and centrally managed programs were established. No systematic method of measuring success in populace and resources control was utilized in any of the countries. Success was evaluated in terms of overall defeat of the insurgency, and specific contributions of individual programs were not determined.

A review of insurgencies in Greece, Malaya, Algeria, and the Philippines disclosed the components or elements of a successful populace and resources control program. These elements are: appropriate legislation and regulations; effective law enforcement forces; a framework of security consisting of secured villages, area, and lines of communications; screening and documentation of the populace; movement control; detection and elimination of the insurgent infrastructure; and the strict control of material resources.

A measurement system to determine success in the populace and resources control program consists of collecting and processing functions. Data on each element of the program is collected and evaluated as precisely as possible. Data on the current situation and accomplishments of the control activities is collected at the village and district

levels. Processing, consisting of collating and consolidating the data and determining the degree of change from one reporting period to another, is accomplished at intervening and national levels. By comparing current information with information from previous reports, changes are computed; and progress and trends are determined.

Trends and changes determined by the measurement system illustrate the direction of progress in populace and resources control. When a careful evaluation is made of the success in the various elements of the program, deficiencies and problem areas become apparent. Action can then be taken to resolve the problem or increase emphasis on deficient aspects. By employing the measurement system, maximum effectiveness of populace and resources control forces can be obtained. The responsible officials are advised on the success of the component parts of the program and can then employ their forces more efficiently.

The feasibility of a measurement system is determined largely by the nature and extent of the populace and resources control program, availability and reliability of information, and the adequacy of competent personnel to collect and process the information. The measurement system requires detailed and accurate data and imposes a requirement for detailed record-keeping at village and district levels. A stable data base is required since progress is gauged by computing changes from report to report and changes in base data, unless identified, will create a false picture of progress.

Measurement of success is an essential part of an effective populace and resources control program. By measuring success of the populace and resources control program in the early stages of an

insurgency, the effectiveness of government control measures will be determined. The government can then take action to improve the program and destroy the insurgency before it becomes a serious threat. When used in conjunction with information from the counterguerrilla and environmental improvement programs, trends and changes derived by the measurement system are useful in considering courses of action in internal defense.

By properly evaluating all aspects of the populace and resources control program, only those restrictive controls necessary need be imposed; and maximum effectiveness of populace and resources control forces will be achieved. Systematic measurement of success in populace and resources control will provide a valuable tool to the internal defense operator by focusing attention to aspects that need improvement and assisting in the overall evaluation of the success of internal defense.

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